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Introduction 
During the last years, the economic crisis has affected European banks activity causing, 
in some cases, threats for banks survival. Consequently, it has strengthened the belief 
that the identification and management of risks are the focus of achieving adequate 
levels of effectiveness and efficiency. 
Before 2007, European banks and other financial activities were characterized, on the 
one hand, by high income, many assets on and off balance and strong recourse to the 
use of leverage; on the other hand, the inappropriate use of derivatives, securitization 
containing collateralized debt obligation and (CDO) and credit default swap (CDS), and 
the conceding of subprime loans have created the conditions of the financial crisis. 
The lack of confidence generated in the financial market has made it increasingly 
pressing need for better disclosure to all stakeholders, as an important element to ease 
the funding of other venture capital and/or debt aimed at improving the competitiveness 
and growth. The quality of the relationships between the bank and the market is linked 
to the ability to communicate their economic and financial performance, highlighting 
the risks that characterize its core business. 
The information opacity of credit intermediaries is often caused by both managerial 
opportunism phenomena and by excessive cost of disclosure. The predominant 
literature, indeed, claims that there are many advantages of a good disclosure that 
results in reduction of the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991), easy access 
to found (Linsey and Schrives, 2005), creation of more stability in the whole banking 
industry and consequent reduction of systemic risk (Nier and Baumann, 2006), and 
effective tool for avoiding banking crises (Financial Stability Board, 2012). However, 
other Authors argue that there are some disadvantages related to the excessive 
disclosure due to the complexity of financial instruments because markets are unable to 
incorporate additional information in a beneficial way (Hodder et al., 2001; Hassan et 
al., 2009; Hassan and Mohd-Saleh, 2010; Siregar et al. 2013). In addition, banks often 
oppose to requirements asking for higher disclosures because they determine significant 
costs (Mozes, 2002, Gebhardt, 2004). 
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On the regulatory side, instead, although it has integrity at the explicit request for 
disclosure under the risk profile, it was not sufficient to guarantee the satisfaction of 
different operators’ needs, with the effect of hiding important difficult cases resulted in 
financial troubles. Indeed, both the International Accounting Standards/International 
Financial Reporting standards (IAS/IFRS) and the Basel Accord have not been effective 
in the control of risk and related systemic effects. Even today are still ongoing revisions 
of the rules aimed at ensuring greater soundness of banks and the stability of the whole 
financial system. 
As events have demonstrated, many European banks and financial intermediaries have 
been unprepared for the events and the risks associated with a major impact on capital, 
financial and economic performance. 
In order to respond to the aforementioned situation of crisis, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has issued the IFRS 7: Financial Instruments 
Disclosure, an ad hoc accounting standard which identifies the minimal disclosure 
requirements that entities must meet to communicate to investors the risks arising from 
financial instruments used. This standard, effective from 2007, partially replaces the 
IAS 32 adding new disclosure. The second part of the accounting principle (par. 31-42) 
discusses financial instruments risk disclosure (FIRD) distinguishing between 
quantitative (synthetic data on risk exposure at the reporting date by type of risk, risk 
concentration, attention to credit risk, a sensitivity analysis to market risk) and 
qualitative information (exhibition the risks and how they are generated, objectives and 
procedures for the management of financial risk and valuation methods, changes 
compared to the past) for each type of financial risk. The disclosures required by IFRS 7 
should allow an accurate assessment of the nature and extent of the risks and the impact 
that the financial instruments have on the performance of the bank. However, up to date, 
to the best of my knowledge there are no studies testing the relevance of disclosure 
required under IFRS 7 from the investors’perspective. 
As is known, the IASB has identified in the relevance a fundamental qualitative 
characteristics of useful financial information.  
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Generally speaking, in the last years, many academics have focused on the value 
relevance of financial reporting. Research on value relevance seek to investigate 
whether data recognized and/or disclosed in financial reporting contain information 
useful for economic operators in order to support them in their investment decisions. In 
other words, the aim of value relevance studies is looking for the association between 
disclosures of financial reporting and stock market prices or changes in stock market 
prices, proxies of an entity’s value. Many scholars and professional associations argue 
that value relevance is an indicator of reliability that lead to an increased transparency. 
Indeed, value relevance can be considered “a measure of transparency because, if stock 
market prices and returns are reflections of economic reality, then the more financial 
reporting reflects economic reality, the greater the association we would expect to see 
between financial reporting and stock market prices or changes in them” (ICAEW, 
2015, p. 23). 
The value relevance of FIRD is an important key factor for a transparent relationship 
between banks and stakeholders, in particular investors, because, first of all, the last 
financial crisis has revealed the weaknesses of the European banking system and related 
disclosure; secondly, banks’ regulatory framework is complex, so it is possible to detect 
cases of information opacity, because it is formulated by a range of different bodies (i.e. 
local banking authority, Basel Committee and European Banking Authority - EBA); 
lastly, a gap in the literature of the relevance of FIRD in the banking sector exists. In 
particular there are not studies on the value relevance of IFRS 7. Indeed, many research 
focus on compliance of IFRS 7 (i.e. Amoako and Asante, 2013; Hossain, 2014) and the 
relevance of particular type of risk (i.e. Bonetti et al., 2012).  
On this basis, the aim of this thesis is to test the value relevance of the financial 
instruments risk disclosure (FIRD) from the users’ perspective, as recommended by the 
IFRS 7 in the European banking sector. In particular, UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
France are investigated because they are countries with highest capitalization in Europe 
from 2007, year of IFRS 7 entry in force, to 2014, last year available. 
The thesis uses price model and a panel data analysis is developed. 
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This study provides a threefold contribution. First, it is useful for investors because they 
may better assess their risk appetite, so they can chose appropriate risk levels. It is 
known that the main tool by which a bank fulfills its disclosure obligations is the 
financial reporting that is designed to inform about the current performance and risks, it 
highlights the past trends and decisions for the future. Many studies have emphasized 
that limited transparency regarding financial instruments risk exposure exist showing 
high opacity of annual reports, leading to the mispricing of risk and misallocation of 
capital, and affecting investors ability to assess their investment decision.  
Second, this study adds knowledge to the scientific debate about value relevance of 
information on financial instruments risks. On the best of my knowledge, there are not 
studies on value relevance of financial risks disclosure according to IFRS 7 in Europe. 
Third, this research is useful for regulators because it can provide important insights 
about any updates on FIRD rules. In particular, banks’ regulatory framework is 
formulated by a range of different bodies causing and, in same cases, rules overlapping. 
Hence, this results may suggest whether regulators have made every effort to ensure 
transparency in the market in terms of financial instruments risk disclosure. 
This thesis is structured as follow.  
The first chapter deals with a review of the state of the art about financial instruments 
risk disclosure. Currently the disclosure on the risks is undergoing an evolutionary 
process, justified by the continuous change of the economic system. The financial 
scandals (i.e. Lehman Brothers, American International Group, Enron, Societe General) 
that have affected the financial system, with a severe impact on the portfolios of many 
investors and on the soundness of the banking system, gave rise to distrust, volatility of 
market prices and a strong need for regulation of information on financial risks. In this 
climate of uncertainty it is important to restore transparency in the system (Lambiase, 
2011). However, despite the continuous raising of the minimum requirements, 
companies do not generally provide adequate information on risk and investors are 
warning about the lack of information on entities’ risk taking (Maffei et al., 2014).  
Since financial report is a tool by which a bank fulfills its disclosure obligations, it is 
possible argue that it assumes a dual function: it must guide the choices of financial 
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operators; it is subject to control by the supervisory bodies, in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of markets (Maffei, 2010). To prosecute these aims it is necessary that the 
banks financial reporting deal with in a broad and comprehensive way the risks 
associated with its brokerage business, which is increasingly addressing to financial 
instruments (Ruozi, 2015). Banks employ various types of financial instruments with 
different risk profiles, to meet the needs of commitment and funding (Maffei, 2011). 
Hence, the banking sector is particularly concerned in financial instruments risk 
disclosure (FIRD) issue, especially during the last financial crisis (Woods et al., 2008; 
Gebardht et al., 2014).  
In addition, the first chapter investigates the regulation about FIRD (III Pillar of Basel 
III and IFRS 7) showing similarities and differences between rules. Hence, banks, in 
addition to fulfilling the reporting requirements of the financial statements, are required 
to provide disclosures on business risks in a further document entitled “Pillar III 
Disclosure requirements” to be drawn up under the provisions laid down in Pillar III the 
New Capital Accord (Basel II). The preparation of this document responds to the 
reporting obligations relating to capital adequacy and risk exposure. Moreover, pursuing 
accountability and transparency objectives of management for even require disclosure 
of the methodologies used to identify, measure, manage, control and monitor risks, 
encouraging, ultimately, the taking of decisions by different market participants. 
Instead, the disclosures required by IFRS 7 should allow an accurate assessment of the 
nature and extent of the risks and the impact that the financial instruments have on the 
performance of the bank.  
The second chapter reviews the value relevance literature, with a focus on FIRD. The 
chapter investigates the positive accounting theory (PAT) as a branch of studies which 
led to the development of those on value relevance. Pioneers of these last are Ball and 
Brown (1968), and Beaver (1968) who introduce the value relevance studies according 
to PAT. They examine the information content of accounting information in relation to 
the equities market prices. The hypothesis at the base of the survey is that if the 
financial information is useful to financial market, then it must be incorporated in the 
stock price. 
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It is also made a classification of value relevance studies (chapter 2.2) with a focus on 
accounting principle. Also in this case, the evidence are mixed showing that some 
Authors find value relevant accounting information; on the contrary, others do not find 
this explanatory power. Thus, a review of empirical models adopted in value relevance 
literature has provided. I discuss price models, return models and balance sheet models 
showing strengths and weaknesses of each one.  
Finally, the development of hypothesis is provided. The concept of information 
asymmetry is discussed according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Ross (1977). The 
agency problem arises in part because of the imperfect observability of managerial 
effort and costly contracting. Hence, the manager (agent), who should serve the interest 
of the shareholders (principal), tries, instead, to maximize his personal wealth. This 
information opacity affects the economic operators’ ability to assess appropriate risk 
levels according to their risk appetite. In particular, the information opacity of credit 
intermediaries is often caused by both managerial opportunism phenomena and by 
excessive cost of disclosure. Hence, on this basis, the main research question is: does 
investors find FIRD provided by banks, under IFRS 7, value relevant?  
In particular, to provide more in depth analysis on IFRS 7, the financial disclosure has 
been divided in qualitative and quantitative financial risk information, so two research 
hypotheses have been formulated. In other words: does investors find 
qualitative/quantitative FIRD provided by banks, under IFRS 7, value relevant? 
With this regard, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) argue that the different nature of 
disclosure is crucial to any analysis as the market responds differently.  
Chapter 3 replies to this questions. As stated above the sample is composed by 546 bank 
observations coming from UK, Italy, Germany, France and Spain over 8-year period, 
2007– 2014. According to value relevance literature, the price model is used and it is 
developed by a panel data analysis. 
The main test variable is the financial disclosure index splitted in qualitative financial 
disclosure index (QLFDI) and quantitative financial disclosure index (QTFDI), and 
other variables are included, such as Core tier 1, volatility, EPS, ROE, Cash flow per 
share, Non performing loan, Liquidity index and Leverage.  
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In order to provide robustness to results, the core tier 1 has substituted to BVPS because 
BVPS (as EPS) is a main variable in value relevance studies, but to adapt the analysis to 
the banking system, the core tier 1 is preferred. 
Final results show that only qualitative index has a positive effect on banks’ value, 
meaning that qualitative disclosure recommended by IFRS 7 is value relevant. Maybe 
qualitative information can be easily found because it is supposed to have a clearer 
language (Pucci and Tutino, 2012). Instead, the quantitative disclosure index is not 
relevant for investors because of uncertainty, multi-person settings with conflicts of 
interest, and information asymmetry. Depending on the assumptions made about these 
factors, it is possible to predict a negative or absent relationship between increased 
disclosure and entities value. For example, if the production of information is costly for 
an entity, investors perceive the business less profitable. Investors sometimes might 
suspect or misinterpret the intentions of the company in providing more information to 
the market. In summary, the impact of disclosure on firm value is still an empirical issue 
that requires further investigation.   
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Chapter 1: Financial instruments disclosure 
1.1 Financial instruments risk disclosure: an overview 
The term “disclosure” indicates the accompanying information of the financial reporting 
(Caldarelli, 2008). Disclosure is a tool of overcoming the limits of the financial 
reporting. Indeed, financial operators use to say “Selling equity is selling story”, i.e. to 
sell the security necessary to sell the story relating to the company and its competitive 
environment. However, due to imperfections, or externalities, of financial market, 
investors are not able to assess entities’ value and consequently to evaluate appropriate 
investments. Information problem arises from information differences, so disclosure is 
critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
The importance of risk disclosures as a tool of helping users to understand the risks 
associated with on - and off - balance sheet items has been accentuated in the last years 
(Maffei et al., 2014). The consequences of limited transparency regarding financial 
instruments risk exposure have highlighted the opacity of annual reports, leading to the 
mispricing of risk and misallocation of capital, and affecting investors ability to assess 
their investment decision. 
Currently the disclosure on the risks is undergoing an evolutionary process, justified by 
the continuous change of the economic system. The financial scandals (i.e. Lehman 
Brothers, American International Group, Enron, Societe General) that have affected the 
financial system, with a severe impact on the portfolios of many investors and on the 
soundness of the banking system, gave rise to distrust, volatility of market prices and a 
strong need for regulation of information on financial risks. In this climate of 
uncertainty it is important to restore transparency in the system (Lambiase, 2011). 
However, despite the continuous raising of the minimum requirements, companies do 
not generally provide adequate information on risk and investors are warning about the 
lack of information on entities’ risk taking (Maffei et al., 2014).  
Indeed, listed companies have improved the amount of information disclosed with 
regard to risks, but disclosing current financial risks will not provide sufficient 
information about the financial status of an entity because financial performance is also 
affected by strategic and operating risks (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
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If listed companies disclose information about existing risks and uncertainties, the 
investors’ ability to assess their risk level is seriously undermined, leading to a lack of 
confidence in the reliability of financial information (Hodder et al., 2001).  
Despite that, literature about the usefulness of risk disclosure is mixed.  
Some studies describe the usefulness of this kind of disclosure to investors. For 
example, Jorion (2002), analyzing VaR as measure of financial risks disclosure, finds 
that it is informative for investors. In addition, Linsmeier et al. (2002) study firms’ that 
disclose FRR 48 about their exposure to interest rate, foreign currency exchange rates, 
and energy prices, finding a decline in trading volume sensitivity. The Authors conclude 
that FRR 48 provide useful information to investors. Other studies claim the relevance 
of proprietary costs which negatively affect firms’ willingness to provide risk disclosure 
(i.e. Oliveira, 2011; Maffei et al., 2014).  
Recent years have seen an increase in demand for improved risk reporting by companies 
and this demand has intensified following the 2007 global financial crisis (ICAEW, 
2011). The call for improved risk reporting is based on the view that it will lead to a 
better understanding of entities risks by investors and other users. Consequently, this 
could lead to a more efficient allocation of resources (ICAEW, 2011).  
This is especially true when some items have a high complexity. This is the case of 
financial instruments (Maffei, 2009). Information about financial instruments plays a 
very important role in determining entities’ financial position and performance.  
The use of financial instruments has increased dramatically over the last two decades, 
leading to many cases of financial loss and bankruptcy due to the sizeable losses arising 
from transactions involving derivative products. A major reason for these financial 
scandals was that the use of financial instruments was not disclosed in the financial 
reporting (Dunne et al., 2004).  
Scholar suggest that disclosing information about financial instruments to shareholders, 
especially on a company’s hedging activities and their associated risk, is a sensitive 
issue (De Marzo and Duffie, 1995). Also Young (1996) argue that financial instruments 
disclosure should provide reliable and clear information which is considered essential 
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for the functioning of an economic system, enhance the visibility of derivative 
instruments and their risk in the financial statements and thereby facilitate better 
decision-making by investors, creditors, and regulators, allow executives’ risk 
management policy to be evaluated, and support the efficient functioning of derivatives 
markets. 
Not only Academics, but also the standard setter (i.e. FASB and IASB) have introduced 
a number of standards which deal with financial instruments recognition and disclosure 
in order to provide useful information for investors.  
The table 1 below shows the financial instruments related statements issued by IASB 
and FASB during the years. 
 
Table 1. Financial instruments related statements issued by IASB and FASB 
Issued Effective IASB FASB 
1990 1991 
IAS 30: Disclosures in 
financial statements of banks 
SFAS 105: Disclosure of 
information about Financial 
instruments with off-balance 
sheet risk and financial 
instruments 
1991 1993  
SFAS 107: Disclosure about Fair 
Value of financial instruments 
1993 1994  
SFAS 115: Accounting for certain 
investments in debt and equity 
securities 
1994 1995  
SFAS 119: Disclosure about 
derivative financial instruments 
and Fair Value of financial 
instruments 
1995 1996 
IAS 32: Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and Presentation 
 
1998 2001 
IAS 39: Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement 
SFAS 133: Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and 
Hedging Activities 
2000 2001  
SFAS 140: Accounting for 
Transfers and Servicing of 
financial instruments 
2003 2004  
SFAS 150: Accounting for 
Certain financial instruments 
2006 2007 
IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure 
SFAS 157: Fair value 
measurements 
2007 2008  
SFAS 159: The fair value option 
for financial assets and liabilities 
2008 2009  SFAS 161: Disclosures about 
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derivatives instruments and 
hedging activities 
2009 2010  
SFAS 166: Accounting for 
transfers of financial assets 
2009 2018 IFRS 9: Financial Instruments  
 Source: Own elaboration 
 
Generally speaking, high quality accounting standards should result in quality financial 
reports and enhanced investor confidence in the credibility of information being 
published, so companies that comply with the accounting standards would be expected 
to produce high quality financial reporting (i.e. Levitt, 1998; Li and Gao, 2007). 
Many studies have been conducted, both in Europe and overseas, showing mixed results 
about financial instruments risk disclosure. 
Goldberg et al. (1994) investigate whether the information provided by SFAS 105, 
SFAS 107 and SFAS 119 is useful for investors in assessing the credit and market risk 
associated with the use of off balance sheet financial instruments. The Authors conclude 
that credit risk information is more useful than market disclosure because this last one is 
inadequate due to a lack of specificity and quantification.  
Otherwise, Palmer and Schwarz (1995) argued that SFAS 105 had a negative impact on 
the clarity of the information disclosed because investors find difficulties to understand 
differecies between required contract dollar amount disclosures and actual risks. In 
addition, no firm provides a useful detailed breakdown of the degree of risk attributable 
to these different activities. 
Edwards and Eller (1995) conduct a study on SFAS 119, finding that derivatives 
became more transparent because information is presented in a way that allows users 
and regulators to to make informed judgements about an entity’s derivatives activity. 
Similarly, Herz et al. (1995) argue that disclosure about derivatives improve after the 
adoption of SFAS 119. 
In contrast with the aforementioned Authors, Kawamura (1996) some point out that 
disclosures on derivatives is incomplete, or less detailed than required. 
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Hodder et al. (2001) investigated the impact of SFAS 115 on banks’ disclosure practices 
and found that banks incurred real costs in making accounting choices under SFAS 115; 
hence, they found that most disclosures were not complete.  
Regarding SFAS 133, Hernández (2003) states that SFAS 133 increases the visibility, 
comparability and understandability of the risks associated with derivatives.  
Otherwise, the study conducted by Bhamornsiri and Schroeder (2004) results in 
derivatives information hard to understand and with a lack of uniformity.  
Similar results are reached by Hamlen and Largay (2005) who investigate the 
disclosures about derivative financial instruments provided by the 30 high-profile 
companies tracked in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA-30). They found that, 
even though, a generally increase in derivatives' disclosures after adopting SFAS 133 
exists, these disclosures are not as informative as one might expect. 
Also Zhang (2009) examine the effect of SFAS 133 disclosure on corporate risk 
management behavior. He concludes that that volatility of cash flows and risk exposures 
related to interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and commodity price decrease 
significantly for speculator firms but not for hedger firms, suggesting that speculators 
engage in more prudent risk-management activities after the adoption of SFAS 133. 
As for the studies in the field of IASB, on the best of my knowledge, Lopes and 
Rodrigues (2007) analyze the annual reports of companies of the STOXX 50 index to 
evaluate their accounting practices for financial instruments and compare them to the 
measurement, recognition and disclosure requirements stipulated in IAS 32 and IAS 39. 
They noted that the overall level of financial instruments disclosure among their sample 
firms was less than satisfactory; the degree of non-compliance ranged from 27% for 
financial firms to 95% for non-financial firms. More specifically, they found that the 
qualitative information provided about risk management policies and derivative 
financial controls was not clearly understood by users; information was general and 
spread out in different parts of the annual reports. 
Following the introduction of IFRS 7, Bischof (2009) investigated the impact of its first 
time adoption on financial instruments disclosure using the annual reports for 171 banks 
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from 28 European countries. The Author concludes that the introduction of IFRS 7 in 
the European banking system has had a positive impact not only on the quantity of 
information disclosed, but only on its quality. He has focused only on banks because the 
impact of the new standard is stronger in this sector than others because financial 
industries hold almost the 90% of financial instruments in their assets.  
In another study about the impact of IFRS 7, Bamber and McMeeking (2010) reviews 
the financial instruments disclosures of the FTSE 100 non-financial IFRS 7 compliant 
firms. They find, similarly to Bischof (2009), that information about financial 
instruments substantially increases (especially qualitative details). In addition, the paper 
indicates that the sample provided voluntary information about financial instruments 
over-and-above the requirements of IFRS 7. 
More recently, using a sample of non-financial firms from STOXX Europe 600 Index, 
Gebhardt (2012) investigates financial instruments disclosure practices based on the 
requirements of IFRS 7 and IAS 39, using content analysis. This evidence refutes the 
pervasive assertions that fair value measurement is diffused and that the quality of fair 
value measurements is poor because of manipulation which might be prone when using 
level 3 measurements. 
Birt et al. (2013) looked at firms in the Australian extractives industry for their study of 
IFRS 7 related disclosures and documented that companies with high leverage and that 
employ a Big 4 audit firm tend to provide larger volumes of disclosure. 
Overall, studies on the effects of financial instruments disclosures in the US field are 
major than those in Europe. In addition, there are also only a few value relevance 
studies focusing on European entities. The majority of them using US datasets and the 
results are often weak and difficult to interpret. Hence, Scholars claim for additional 
studies with more up-to-date data especially from IFRS financial reporting and with 
refined methodologies (i.e. Gebhardt, 2012). 
1.2 Risk disclosure: a literature review  
The reason why current risk disclosure practice may be un-useful to users of financial 
information may rely in the proprietary costs theory because it can explain costs and 
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benefits of disclosure. Indeed, most entities may be reluctant to disclose information 
since they feel it is commercially or politically sensitive (Marshall and Weetman, 2007). 
This is because “outside parties (may) use the information in ways that are harmful to 
its interests (e.g., competitors, pressure groups)” (Cormier et al., 2005; pp. 8–9). 
Entities do not know what is the better strategy of disclosure because, if they disclose 
poor information their risk management systems may be perceived as weak, so investors 
may feel that the entities disclosures are limited or think they have something to hide; 
otherwise, if entities disclose more pieces of information theu could be incur in incur 
proprietary costs. 
Thus, according to the finance theory, Verrecchia (1983) suggests that the decision to 
disclose information is a function of the consequential costs. Indeed, the finance theory 
suggests that more public information enhances an entity value by reducing the firm's 
cost of capital and increasing the cash flows. More specifically, “bad news results in a 
cost because investors and potential investors are discouraged. However, if the 
disclosure of bad news prevents potential competitors entering the market or a particular 
subsection of the market, future cash flows may increase as a result” (Abraham and 
Shrives, 2014, p.93). Obviously, the similar logic is true for good news because they 
can, on one hand, result in positive future cash flows by making the company more 
attractive to outside investors; on the other hand they can encourage competitors and 
potential competitors to enter the market, thereby reducing those future cash flows. 
The introduction of IAS/IFRS has certainly increased the level of disclosure quality in 
Europe (Daske, 2008; Wang et al., 2008; Bischof, 2009; Beuselinck et al., 2010; Byard 
et al., 2011; Jansson et al., 2012) with better consequences on financial reporting 
transparency. Generally speaking, the majority of entities are motivated to provide high 
quality information when they believe that the information is a good new to the market, 
hence the quality of information would have a positive effect on entities’ share price.  
Literature provides theoretical reasons why, under information asymmetry, more precise 
disclosures should be useful for investors. In other words, higher information quality 
lowers the information asymmetries between entities and investors, thus increasing 
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liquidity and ultimately lowering the required rates of return (e.g., Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 2001). 
However, the increasing complexity of business strategies, operations, and regulations 
makes it quite difficult for investors to appreciate financial information on its own 
without clear, accompanying explanations (Marston and Shrives, 1991). The accounting 
information currently issued by firms is not wholly adequate when used for decision 
making purposes, and within that process, for forecasting, for which additional 
information on risks is required (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Furthermore, the financial 
crisis has exacerbated some accounting lacks, including failure to account for 
uncertainty and inadequate communication of the impact of risk-taking, thereby 
undermining the reliability and relevance of disclosures (Magnan and Markarian, 2011).  
Indeed, the presentation of risk in annual reports was not standardized and descriptions 
of risk disclosure were vague and elusive (Oliveira et al., 2013). 
Linsley et al., (2006) and Linsley and Lawrence (2007) find that the risk disclosures are 
dispersed throughout the report and are incomplete, showing that the level of  
readability is difficult or very difficult for investors. Therefore, the risk information 
needs of readers of the annual report are only being partially satisfied. 
Similarly, Oliveira et al. (2011) highlight problems of relevance, reliability and 
understandability due to different maturity time bands that report exposures to credit, 
market and liquidity risks; different Value-at-Risk and sensitivity analysis assumptions; 
and different practices for reporting capital structure and adequacy. 
Overall, it seems that risk disclosure lacked transparency, in particular disclosure about 
financial instruments (Oliveira et al., 2013)  
Maffei et al. (2014) argue that risk disclosure is not useful for stakeholders, as it is not 
really detailed, nor forward-looking, nor sufficient for the assessment of the overall risk 
profile, nor relevant for the decision-making process.  
Scholars do not focus only on the quantity of information in the risk report, but analyze 
its quality putting into the light the weaknesses due to a disclosure too much qualitative 
and generic, with little information about the mitigation of risks, and little discussion 
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about how risk arose and was being managed (Linsley et al, 2006; Magnan and 
Markarian, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2013). 
Indeed, there are few and uncorrect details about VaR model. See, for example, 
Pérignon and Smith (2010) who claim that historical simulation based on past events 
was the method used most often to assess VaR, but it has very little information 
emerged about future volatility. Moreover, these disclosures are very difficult to audit 
(Woods et al., 2008). 
The problem of these highlighted deficiencies is that the forward looking disclosures is 
scarce. The consequences are low levels of comparability, reliability and 
understandability of information provided. 
On the other hand, many studies claim the usefulness of risk disclosure for investors and 
other stakeholders. 
Jorion (2002) conducts a study VaR as measure of the dollar amount of potential loss 
from adverse market moves, so it has considered as standard benchmark for measuring 
financial risks. Investigating the relation between the trading VaR disclosed by a small 
sample of US commercial banks and the subsequent variability of their trading 
revenues, the Author concludes that VaR disclosure is informative for analysts and 
investors.   
Linsmeier et al. (2002) find that SEC FRR No 48 reduce investors uncertainty and 
diversity of opinion about the implication of changes in interest rates, foreign currency 
exchange rates and commodity prices.  
Kravet and Muslu (2011) analyze the annual changes in risk disclosures and find that 
they are significantly and positively associated with changes in daily stock return 
volatility, changes in volatility of negative daily returns, filing volume, changes in 
trading volume, changes in dispersion of outstanding forecasts, and volatility of forecast 
revisions. Hence, they conclude that risk disclosures increase investors’ risk 
perceptions. 
Similarly, Campbell et al. (2014) study the information content of risk factor disclosures 
for market-based risk, information asymmetry, and stock returns required by SEC to 
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analyze market participants incorporate the information conveyed by risk factor 
disclosures into their assessments of firm risk and stock price, and that the disclosure 
decreases information asymmetry amongst firms’ shareholders. Authors find that that 
managers provide informative risk factor disclosures, and market participants 
incorporate the information conveyed by these disclosures into their assessments of firm 
risk.  
Overall, studies about the usefulness, or unusefulness, of risk disclosure is still an open 
issue so it is necessary to fill the gap in the aforementioned literature. Indeed, the debate 
about financial risk is evolving because they are changing over time since they are 
changing the socio-economic contexts. Therefore, claim to find a comprehensive model 
in order to control risks is illusory. 
1.3 The financial instruments risk disclosure in the banking sector  
With respect to the banking sector, the financial reporting assumes a dual function: it 
must guide the choices of financial operators; it is subject to control by the supervisory 
bodies, in order to ensure the proper functioning of markets (Maffei, 2010).  
To prosecute these aims it is necessary that the banks financial reporting deal with in a 
broad and comprehensive way the risks associated with its brokerage business, which is 
increasingly addressing to financial instruments (Ruozi, 2015).  
Banks employ various types of financial instruments with different risk profiles, to meet 
the needs of commitment and funding (Maffei, 2011). Hence, the banking sector is 
particularly concerned in financial instruments risk disclosure (FIRD) issue, especially 
during the last financial crisis (Woods et al., 2008; Gebardht et al., 2014).  
It seems also that supervisory and regulatory bodies have not been able to perform their 
tasks. Proof of this is the banking crisis of 2007 raised in the US and swiftly spread 
throughout Europe (Malinconico, 2007). In recent years, policy makers such as the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel) have taken significant steps to improve market reporting, with IFRS 
7 and the III Pillar of the revised Framework for International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards.  
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Professional and regulatory associations (Cadiou and Mars, 2009) claim that the 
combined use of IFRS 7 and Pillar III of Basel Agreement will have a positive effect on 
FIRD.  
1.4 The regulation of financial instruments risk disclosure  
In the next sections, I analyze both Pillar III requirements and IFRS 7 showing 
similarities and differences. Indeed, some of the Pillar III disclosures overlap with the 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 with regard to the qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures. The Basel Committee has claimed that, in order to help users benefit from 
the two sets of information, and to understand the structuring of accounting and 
prudential information, banks should provide adequate explanation in their Pillar III 
disclosures on the differences in the scope of consolidation for accounting and 
regulatory purposes, as required by the CRD (annex XII Part 2 point 2). 
1.4.1 Basel III: Third Pillar 
Banks, in addition to fulfilling the reporting requirements of the financial statements, 
are required to provide disclosures on business risks in a further document entitled 
“Pillar III Disclosure requirements” to be drawn up under the provisions laid down in 
Pillar III the New Capital Accord (Basel II). 
The preparation of this document responds to the reporting obligations relating to 
capital adequacy and risk exposure. In addition, pursuing accountability and 
transparency objectives of management for even require disclosure of the 
methodologies used to identify, measure, manage, control and monitor risks, 
encouraging, ultimately, the taking of decisions by different market partecipants. 
The Pillar III aim then is to supplement the minimum capital requirements (Pillar I) and 
the supervisory review process (SReP) (Pillar II). 
In particular, the Committee has provided a minimum level of information that must be 
guaranteed by all operators, and brokers who have chosen to use internal methods and 
more sophisticated for the calculation of requirements under Pillar I should provide 
more information in order to ensure consistent disclosures with the complexity of the 
bank itself. 
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The disclosure obligations of the banking institutions, provided for in the Pillar III of 
Basel, from 2013 have been subject to a continuous and gradual change, in response to 
the latest agreement, known as Basel III, which will be fully operational in 2019. This 
measure has become necessary following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, which 
highlighted a number of weaknesses. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) also sets out, in order to 
improve market discipline and transparency, specific disclosure requirements by 
requiring the publication by banks of a reconciliation between the elements that make 
up the regulatory capital and the items within the corresponding financial statements 
and other information relating to the characteristics of the equity instruments issued. 
The main goal of the BCBS is the market discipline because the provision of relevant 
and reliable information about common key risk metrics to market participants is 
fundamental for a stable banking system. It reduces information asymmetry and 
improve comparability of banks within and across Countries. Pillar III of the Basel 
framework aims to promote market discipline through regulatory disclosure 
requirements. These requirements helps investors to capture information relating to a 
bank’s regulatory capital and risk exposures. 
The ratio under market discipline are: 1) banks show a high degree of “opacity” which 
makes it difficult to correctly evaluate the risk of their investments; 2) they are financed 
by individuals (depositors) that are unable to properly evaluate risk and to suitably price 
it by demanding higher rates to riskier banks; 3) play a major role in the economic 
system– as channels for the transmission of monetary policy and managers of a large 
part of the payment system – and thus are entitled to use instruments such as special 
funding from the Central Bank and deposit insurance, which together create a safety net 
that discourages creditors to assess the bank’s soundness (Resti and Sironi, 2007). 
On January 2015, the BCBS issued the revised Pillar III with the aim to 1) adopt a 
specific approach both to the credit, market, liquidity and operational risks and banks 
capitalization; 2) develop a common disclosure framework based around Pillar I that 
lead investors to take informed investment decisions, in particulat after the 2007 
financial crisis. In addition, it must be published concurrently with its financial report 
for the corresponding period and the information provided must be subject, at a 
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minimum, to the same level of internal review and internal control processes. Table 2 
presents a summary of the disclosure requirements under Pillar II.
22 
  
Table 2. Pillar III Disclosure requirements 
  Tables and templates 
Fixed 
format 
Flexible 
format 
Quarterly 
Semi-
annually 
Annually 
Part 2 – 
Overview of risk 
management and 
RWA 
OVA – Bank risk management approach   X     X 
OV1 – Overview of RWA X   X     
Part 3 – Linkages 
between financial 
statements and 
regulatory exp. 
LI1 – Differences between acc. and regulatory scopes of 
consolidation and mapping of financial statements with regulatory 
risk categories 
  X     X 
LI2 – Main sources of differences between regulatory exp. 
amounts and carrying values in financial statements 
  X     X 
LIA – Explanations of differences between accounting and 
regulatory exposure amounts 
  X     X 
Part 4 – Credit 
risk 
CRA – General information about credit risk   X     X 
CR1 – Credit quality of assets X     X   
CR2 – Changes in stock of defaulted loans and debt securities X     X   
CRB – Additional disclosure related to the credit quality of assets   X     X 
CRC – Qualitative disclosure requirements related to credit risk 
mitigation techniques 
  X     X 
CR3 – Credit risk mitigation techniques – overview X     X   
CRD – Qualitative disclosures on banks’ use of external credit 
ratings under the standardised approach for credit risk 
  X     X 
CR4 – Standardised approach – credit risk exposure and Credit 
Risk Mitigation (CRM) effects 
X     X   
CR5 – Standardised approach – exposures by asset classes and risk 
weights 
X     X   
CRE – Qualitative disclosures related to IRB models   X     X 
CR6 – IRB - Credit risk exposures by portfolio and PD range X     X   
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CR7 – IRB – Effect on RWA of credit derivatives used as CRM 
techniques 
X     X   
CR8 – RWA flow statements of credit risk exposures under IRB X   X     
CR9 – IRB – Backtesting of probability of default (PD) per 
portfolio 
  X     X 
CR10 – IRB (specialised lending and equities)   X   X   
Part 5 – 
Counterparty 
credit risk 
CCRA – Qualitative disclosure related to counterparty credit risk   X     X 
CCR1 – Analysis of counterparty credit risk (CCR) exposure by 
approach 
X     X   
CCR2 – Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) capital charge X     X   
CCR3 – Standardised approach of CCR exposures by regulatory 
portfolio and risk weights 
X     X   
CCR4 – IRB – CCR exposures by portfolio and PD scale X     X   
CCR5 – Composition of collateral for CCR exposure   X   X   
CCR6 – Credit derivatives exposures   X   X   
CCR7 – RWA flow statements of CCR exposures under the 
Internal Model Method (IMM) 
X   X     
CCR8 – Exposures to central counterparties X     X   
Part 6 – 
Securitisation 
SECA – Qualitative disclosure requirements related to 
securitisation exposures 
  X     X 
SEC1 – Securitisation exposures in the banking book   X   X   
SEC2 – Securitisation exposures in the trading book   X   X   
SEC3 – Securitisation exposures in the banking book and 
associated regulatory capital requirements – bank acting as 
originator or as sponsor 
X     X   
SEC4 – Securitisation exposures in the banking book and 
associated capital requirements – bank acting as investor 
X     X   
Part 7 – Market 
risk 
MRA – Qualitative disclosure requirements related to market risk   X     X 
MRB – Qualitative disclosures for banks using the Internal Models   X     X 
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Approach (IMA) 
MR1 – Market risk under standardised approach X     X   
MR2 – RWA flow statements of market risk exposures under an 
IMA 
X   X     
MR3 – IMA values for trading portfolios X     X   
MR4 – Comparison of VaR estimates with gains/losses   X   X   
Source: BCBS (2015). Revised Pillar III disclosure requirement
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1.4.2 IFRS 7 
The risk management process within banks is crucial for their survival, but the impact 
of the financial risks on credit institutions is not an issue that involves the internal actors 
only, but also concerns the external parties (stakeholders), who daily interact with the 
banks, and therefore they need to be informed as much on risks as the use of financial 
instruments. 
The main tool by which a bank fulfills its disclosure obligations is the financial 
reporting that is designed to inform about the current performance, it highlights the past 
trends and decisions for the future. 
The term “disclosure” indicates the accompanying information of the financial reporting 
(Caldarelli, 2008). The need to enrich the information framework of balance sheet items 
is felt especially when the object of detection operations have a high complexity. This is 
the case of financial instruments (Maffei, 2009). In addition, the process of 
globalization and evolution of financial markets, which originated in the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first century, has highlighted an issue of no small account linked to the 
inconsistency and lack of comparability of financial statements of companies the 
different European countries, drawn up on the basis of very different principles. 
In order to solve this problem, the European Community with the Community 
Regulation n. 1606 of 2002 establishes the obligation to adopt the IAS/IFRS issued by 
the IASB, for EU companies listed on regulated markets as well as with financial 
instruments widely distributed among the public (banks, insurance). These principles 
have been introduced since 2005. 
In 2005, the IASB issued IFRS 7, which replaced IAS 30 and the disclosure 
requirements of IAS 32. IFRS 7 governs the disclosures related, than the information 
already provided by IAS 32 and IAS 39, regarding the significance of financial 
instruments for the entity's financial position and financial performance exposure to 
credit, market and liquidity arising from financial instruments. The accounting policy is 
applied to all financial instruments (shares, bonds, derivatives) understood as any 
contract that gives rise to a financial asset for one entity and a financial liability of 
another entity. 
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The disclosures required by IFRS 7 should allow an accurate assessment of the nature 
and extent of the risks and the impact that the financial instruments have on the 
performance of the bank.  
The second part of the accounting principle (par. 31-42) discusses FIRD distinguishing 
between quantitative (synthetic data on risk exposure at the reporting date by type of 
risk, risk concentration, attention to credit risk, a sensitivity analysis to market risk) and 
qualitative information (exhibition the risks and how they are generated, objectives and 
procedures for the management of financial risk and valuation methods, changes 
compared to the past) for each type of financial risk. 
Qualitative information are common to all financial risk: 
1. the exposures to risk and how they arise; 
2. its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and the methods used to 
measure the risk; 
3. any changes from the previous period. 
More details on IFRS 7 financial risk disclosure requirements are provided in table 3. 
Regarding credit risk, IFRS 7 requires disclosure about the exposures to risk, a 
description of collateral held as security, information about the credit quality of 
financial assets that are neither past due nor impaired. Banks should indicates the 
amount that best represents its maximum exposure to credit risk at the end of the 
reporting period without taking account of any collateral held because credit risk is, 
ceteris paribus, greater or less with respect the type of guarantees received. For this 
reason, the accounting standard provides even the description of collateral to mitigate 
credit risk. 
With regard the liquidity risk, the indexes analysis is not sufficient to test the entity’s 
liquidity because they are historical markers with a very low forecast ability. In order to 
avoid this problem, IFRS 7 requires a more dynamic approach to liquidity risk. Indeed, 
it focuses on expected inflows and outflows (Fortuna, 2010).
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Table 3. IFRS 7 financial risk requirements 
  Credit risk  Market risk Liquidity risk 
Qualitative 
information 
(a) the exposures to risk and how they arise (a) the exposures to risk and how they arise (a) the exposures to risk and how they arise 
(b) its objectives, policies and processes for 
managing the risk and the methods used to 
measure the risk 
(b) its objectives, policies and processes for 
managing the risk and the methods used to 
measure the risk 
(b) its objectives, policies and processes for 
managing the risk and the methods used to 
measure the risk 
(c) any changes in (a) or (b) from the 
previous period 
(c) any changes in (a) or (b) from the 
previous period 
(c) any changes in (a) or (b) from the 
previous period 
Quantitative 
information 
(a) the amount that best represents its 
maximum exposure to credit risk at the end 
of the reporting period without taking 
account of any collateral held or other credit 
enhancements (eg netting agreements that 
do not qualify for offset in accordance with 
IAS 32); this disclosure is not required for 
financial instruments whose carrying 
amount best represents the maximum 
exposure to credit risk 
(a) a sensitivity analysis for each type of 
market risk to which the entity is exposed at 
the end of the reporting period, showing 
how profit or loss and equity would have 
been affected by changes in the relevant risk 
variable that were reasonably possible at 
that date 
(a) a maturity analysis for non-derivative 
financial liabilities (including 
issued financial guarantee contracts) that 
shows the remaining 
contractual maturities 
(b) a description of collateral held as 
security and other credit enhancements, and 
their financial effect (eg a quantification of 
the extent to which collateral and other 
credit enhancements mitigate credit risk) in 
respect of the amount that best represents 
the maximum exposure to credit risk 
(whether disclosed in accordance with (a) or 
represented by the carrying amount of a 
financial instrument) 
(b) the methods and assumptions used in 
preparing the sensitivity analysis 
(b) a maturity analysis for derivative 
financial liabilities. The maturity 
analysis shall include the remaining 
contractual maturities for those 
derivative financial liabilities for which 
contractual maturities are 
essential for an understanding of the timing 
of the cash flows 
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(c)information about the credit quality of 
financial assets that are neither past due nor 
impaired 
(a) an explanation of the method used in 
preparing such a sensitivity analysis, and of 
the main parameters and assumptions 
underlying the 
data provided 
(c) a description of how it manages the 
liquidity risk inherent in (a) and (b) 
(a) an analysis of the age of financial assets 
that are past due as at the end of the 
reporting period but not impaired 
(b)an explanation of the objective of the 
method used and of limitations that may 
result in the information not fully reflecting 
the fair value of the assets and liabilities 
involved   
(b) an analysis of financial assets that are 
individually determined to be impaired as at 
the end of the reporting period, including 
the factors the entity considered in 
determining that they are impaired 
When the sensitivity analyses disclosed in 
accordance with paragraph 40 or 41 are 
unrepresentative of a risk inherent in a 
financial instrument (for examplebecause 
the year-end exposure does not reflect the 
exposure during the year), the entity shall 
disclose that fact and the reason it believes 
the sensitivity analyses are unrepresentative    
(a) the nature and carrying amount of the 
assets     
(b) when the assets are not readily 
convertible into cash, its policies for 
disposing of such assets or for using them in 
its operations     
Source: Own elaboration 
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Lastly, disclosure about market risk focuses on the sensitivity analysis. It is consists to 
identify what would be the effects on the financial reporting if, ceteris paribus, some 
key variables related to market risk could have changed. Appendix B of the principle 
indicates some possible relevant variables: the curve of interest rates, exchange rates, 
stock prices, commodity prices. IFRS 7 does not require to consider all the effects of the 
various possible values which the sensitivity analysis variables can assume, but only for 
those reasonably possible. 
Table 4 shows the minimum disclosure requirements before and after the adoption of 
IFRS 7.  
Table 4. Minimum disclosure requirements before and after the adoption of IFRS 
7 
Risk category 
Before IFRS 7 adoption (IAS 1, IAS 
30 and IAS 32) 
After IFRS 7 adoption (IAS 1, IFRS 
7) 
Generic 
Basis of preparation of financial 
statements 
Specific accounting policies used 
(such as the basis of measurement) 
Description of financial risk 
management objectives and policies 
Basis of preparation of financial 
statements 
Specific accounting policies used 
(such as the basis of measurement) 
Description of financial risk 
management objectives and policies 
Credit 
Details of movements in any 
allowance for impairment losses and 
advances during the period 
Aggregate amount of impairment 
losses 
Maximum credit risk exposures 
Potential risk concentrations (for 
example by industry type) 
Total credit risk exposure and quality 
Analysis of aged, past due, non-
impaired assets 
Analysis of individual impaired 
financial assets 
Collateral held or repossessed 
Carrying amounts of renegotiated 
assets 
Market 
Interest risk exposure detailed by 
contractual repricing or maturity dates 
Nature and extent of off-balance sheet 
instruments exposed to interest rate 
risk 
Repricing gap analysis 
Sensitivity analysis of how risk 
exposures are managed and controlled 
Detailed information about Value-at-
Risk models (assumptions, parameters 
and limitations) 
Sensitivity analysis for each type of 
market risk 
Description of the method, 
assumptions and parameters used 
Liquidity 
Liquidity gap analysis of assets and 
liabilities according to their maturity 
Maturity analysis for financial 
liabilities 
Qualitative disclosures about how 
liquidity risk is managed 
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Capital 
structure 
and adequacy 
  
Description of what is managed as 
capital 
Nature of capital requirements 
imposed externally 
Description of how capital 
requirements are incorporated into 
management of capital 
Description of how managing capital 
objectives are met 
Source: Oliveira et al., 2011 
 
We can see that there are not differences about generic type of risks. The news related 
to credit risk is the description of the collateral and the risk exposure with and without 
the presentation of guarantees. Disclosure about market risk provides more pieces of 
information for VaR techniques and sensitivity analysis, while for liquidity risk 
provides more maturity analysis and qualitative information. After the adoption of IFRS 
7 also information about capital structure and capital adequacy are provided. 
Table 5 shows differences between IFRS 7 and Pillar III requirements. They are very 
similar, with the exception of operational risk that is not required by IFRS 7. 
Table 5. Differences between IFRS 7 and III Pillar 
 IFRS 7 Pillar III 
Market risk VaR and sensitivity analysis VaR and sensitivity analysis 
Credit risk 
Requires presentation of maximum 
credit risk exposure 
Requires exposure at default 
Disclosures for portfolios subject 
to the Internal Ratings 
Disclosures on risk characteristics 
(sector geography) and impairment 
analysis 
Liquidity risk 
Require specific disclosures on 
liquidity risk 
Does not require any specific 
disclosures on liquidity risk 
Operational risk Does not cover operational risk Cover operational risk 
Source: Own elaboration 
Currently academic empirical research on IFRS 7 mostly concentrated on compliance 
and relevance on selected type of risk disclosure. Therefore, my study has the aim to be 
different from previous ones because first, it focuses on all types of financial risk 
information under IFRS 7 (credit, market and liquidity risks) in the European banking 
sector and, secondly, it analyses the value relevance of FIRD required by the 
aforementioned accounting principle. 
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Although the disclosure requirements by IFRS 7, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 
2011, claimed the need to improve risk disclosures based on input from investors and 
other key stakeholders writing: “Without clear and complete disclosures of a company’s 
risk exposures, its plans and strategies for bearing and mitigating those risks, and the 
effectiveness of its risk management strategies, investors will be unable to evaluate 
either the company’s potential risks and rewards or its expected future outcomes” (Papa, 
2016; FSB, 2011). 
1.4.3 IFRS 9 
In 2018, IFRS 7 will be joined by IFRS 9: Financial Instruments to enhance 
transparency in financial market. 
Market discipline is defined as the ‘actions of shareholders, creditors and counterparties 
of banking companies that can influence the investment, operational and risk-taking 
decisions of bank managers’ (Brealy et al., 2012). 
The greater the level and quality of disclosure, the greater the ability of stakeholders to 
monitor and assess changes in bank condition, and to incorporate those assessments into 
a firm’s security price if negative changes occur. This monitoring mechanism generates 
market signals that convey useful information to supervisors responsible for reducing a 
bank’s risk exposure. 
The current accounting policy for the evaluation of financial instruments is the IAS 39, 
but the financial crisis has spread the belief that the accounting rules have helped to 
accelerate the deepening of the economic recession, mainly due to the excessive 
recourse to the use of fair value accounting for the account of financial instruments. In 
particular, they were highlighted delays in the surveys of losses on loans and financial 
assets, as well as its the improper use. Moreover, there was the risk of increasing the 
volatility profit or loss for the year. This led in 2014 to the adoption of IFRS 9, that will 
replace IAS 39, and it will endorsed on 1 January 2018. 
IFRS 9 provides the recognition of a financial instrument at the moment of signing the 
contract. The recognition is at fair value, except for trade receivables, which are 
recorded at the transaction price of the agreement with the customer. The new principle 
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also introduces a new approach to the classification of financial instruments, including 
derivatives embedded in other financial instruments, based on cash flow and business 
model for which the asset is held, which allows us to obtain better information about the 
methods of realization of cash flows. This classification is called principle based and 
mitigates the difficulties of analysis related to IAS 39, which provides for the 
classification rules for the different categories. 
As regards the impairment of receivables, the new model (expected loss model), differs 
significantly from the model in accordance with IAS 39. The “incurred loss model” 
model involves the recognition of the loss only when there is a negative event able to 
produce it. This approach is likely to be dangerous for an entity because, belatedly 
recognizing impairment on loans, it can distribute dividends to shareholders, even of 
components required to cover the risks of future losses. Hence, the occurrence of the 
loss, the bank does not have the resources needed to counter it, being forced to run for 
cover asking liquidity under disadvantageous conditions, leading to a worsening of the 
loss. The expected loss model instead considers the losses expected at the time of 
recognition and ascribes directly to the income statement during the life of the financial 
instrument and not when impairment occurs. The adoption of this policy, from 2018 
will also allow a first step towards the harmonization of accounting rules on financial 
instruments issued by the IASB and the FASB. 
1.5 Financial instruments risk disclosure in the banking sector: a 
literature review 
In 2008, the Financial Stability Board emphasized that the banking sector often failed to 
disclose the magnitude of risk associated with bank products in a clear and easily 
accessible way (Oliveira et al., 2011). Also, analysts and regulators have expressed 
concern that bank financial statements do not adequately represent the underlying 
economics of financial investments, and financial reporting is likely to be more opaque 
than industrial companies’ (Anandarajan et al., 2011). The recent crisis confirms how 
investors do not have enough information to assess these risks, which led to a dramatic 
increase in funding costs (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
33 
  
 
To this end, academics frequently have claimed the opacity with which financial 
institutions accumulated significant exposures to financial risks (Flannery et al., 2004; 
Siregar et al., 2013).  
Although IFRS 7 is in force since 2007, a lack of transparency in risk reporting 
disclosures of banks is found in periods before its adoption but also after it. 
The persistence of risk disclosure deficiencies reported after the adoption of IFRS 7 
suggests that the G20 recommendations (that led to the Basel II Accord reforms, the 
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), and IFRS 7 amendments) will lead to a socially 
desirable flow of information only if appropriate enforcement mechanisms are instituted 
to assure compliance with minimum disclosure requirements (Oliveira et al., 2011).  
Nowadays, risk disclosure in the banking sector is under-researched (Wood et al., 
2008).  
The banking industry has a sub-optimal disclosure level because of their opaque nature 
(Diamond, 1984). Indeed, the Author argument about how disclosure can reduce the 
costly acquisition of information, and therefore explain how it can be considered a 
socially desirable good. Hence, greater levels of disclosure can reduce banking 
instability associated with socially undesirable “runs” on banks (Oliveira et al., 2011). 
Studies by Flanney et al. (2004 and 2013) argue that if outside investors have difficulty 
valuing banks, then market microstructure theory suggests that bank stocks should have 
distinct trading characteristics, such as higher bid-ask spreads and less trading volume. 
In addition, the aforementioned Authors, provide some evidence that bank stocks have 
less market liquidity than comparable non-banks, particularly during the recent financial 
crisis. Furthermore, their results are driven by banks that are most likely to be opaque. 
Opacity and reluctance of bank disclosure have also been explained in the framework of 
the traditional banking theory (Dobler, 2008).  
Proprietary information i.e. on credit quality of private and firm customers reflects the 
core business of banks, which is based on the costly monitoring of debt contracts 
(Diamond, 1984). Since disclosure of this proprietary information would notably affect 
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the bank’s profitability (Frolov, 2007) or cause crises (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998), too 
much disclosure is unlikely about credit risks (Bischof, 2009). 
Moreover, scholars also argue that the regulatory framework on bank financial risk 
disclosure is formulated by a range of different bodies (the Basel Committee, the 
national banking supervisor and the local accounting standard board), hence this 
multitude of bodies and regulations increases banks informational complexity. 
Consequently, banks often oppose to requirements asking for higher disclosures because 
they determine significant costs (Mozes, 2002; Gebhardt et al., 2004).  
It may happen that information accentuate situations of turbulence as the market is not 
able to distinguish vulnerable situations from those solid. Indeed, greater disclosure can 
increase the negative externalities by increasing the pressure on a bank that it does not 
healthy perceived by the market, thus contributing to its failure (Nagel, 2001). 
The opacity, combined with the inconsistence of existing regulations, led to pressures 
on the IASB for the issuing of new standards, i.e. IFRS 7, in order to enhance related 
disclosure (Bischof, 2009) However, several scholars claim their skepticism on the 
potential benefits of an improved disclosure, suggesting that due to the complexity of 
many financial instruments, markets are unable to incorporate additional information in 
a beneficial way (Hodder et al., 2001; Hassan et al., 2009; Hassan and Mohd-Saleh, 
2010; Siregar et al. 2013). 
Generally speaking, the effect of mandatory disclosure can have mixed consequences. 
An increase of compliance cost can arise with mandatory disclosure, but, at the same 
time, positive externality in a perfectly competitive market could arise from increased 
liquidity and reduced costs of information. Therefore, entities that disclose full 
information could be used by investors as a guide to assess their performance and risks. 
Some scholars like Baumann and Nier (2004) argue that banks with high disclosure 
level have less volatility in their share prices. At the same time, banks that disclose 
more information have a better capitalization (Baumann and Nier, 2003). 
Nier (2005) argues that transparency reduces the chance of severe banking problems 
and thus enhances overall financial stability. In addition, Tadesse (2006) finds that 
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banking crises are less likely in countries with greater regulated disclosure and 
transparency. Specifically, banking systems are less vulnerable to crisis if supported by 
financial reporting regimes characterized by more comprehensive disclosure and more 
informative reporting. 
However, if markets are imperfectly competitive, then increased disclosure may attract 
investors away from other entities, resulting in lower price efficiency (Bushee and Leuz, 
2005; Hassan et al., 2009). 
More recently, Blau et al. (2017) find that the process of intermediation is opaque and 
produces uncertainty about the riskiness of banks, which may adversely affect the 
efficiency of bank stock prices. 
Studies on financial instruments risk disclosure in the banking sector also concerned 
both the impact of the III Pillar of Basel Agreement and IAS/IFRS (actually IFRS 7) 
because they are the mayor frameworks about financial disclosure in Europe.  
The Basel Committee has published three studies to date
1
examining bank risk 
disclosures. The three disclosure studies adopt identical research methods, although the 
samples of banks surveyed differs between the three years. The survey instrument 
comprised a detailed list of 104 questions that the Basel Committee considered useful 
for their own disclosure review purposes and are grouped into 12 categories. 
Evidence shows that banks provide more disclosure about capital structure, accounting 
and presentation policies, and other risks, particularly in quantitative form. 
Banks with higher levels of risk have a greater incentive to demonstrate that they are 
actively monitoring and managing those risks and to ensure they are not penalized 
excessively by the market.  
Furthermore, many Scholars have investigated the impact of the III Pillar on banks’ risk 
disclosure.  
                                                          
1
 Public disclosures by banks: results of the 1999 disclosure survey (2001), Public disclosures by banks: 
results of the 2000 disclosure survey (2002), Public disclosures by banks: results of the 2001 disclosure 
survey (2003) 
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A recent study by Bischof (2013) posits that the improved banks risk disclosures 
translate into higher market liquidity around Pillar 3, but not around IFRS 7. The results 
indicate that the success of regulation depends on the institutional fit between regulator 
and regulatee, and that having multiple regulators may lead to inconsistent 
implementation and enforcement of the same rules. Hence, the disclosure increase is 
larger in countries where the banking regulator has more supervisory powers and 
resources, and is less involved in the general oversight of securities markets.  
According to the Basel Committee, disclosure promotes financial stability because 
regular and continuous information may limit potential market disruption. In addition 
adequate public disclosure facilitates a more efficient allocation of capital between 
banks, as it helps the market accurately assess and compare the perspectives of risk and 
performance of individual institutions. It can bring high benefits to the bank because 
they disclose more information than provided by the law increases the management 
reliability (Nagel, 2001, Malinconico, 2007). 
Linsley and Schrives (2005) have used the surveys from the Basel Committee on banks 
which were under Basel I and previous research on UK banks in a period from 1999 and 
2001, concluding that disclosure requirements by the III Pillar is useful, but it not 
provides a comprehensive view of the entity's risk profile because it lacks forward 
looking information. 
The problem with backward looking information is it is unreliable, so Authors suggest 
that additional information is necessary to the III Pillar information. 
In 2006, Herting analyzed the disclosure about Internal Rating Based method (IRB) of a 
sample of European, Japanes and US banks and he found that banks have no incentive 
to disclose this information due to additional costs (Mozes, 2002). 
Vauhkonen (2012) has studied the impact of the III Pillar of Basel II requirements on 
the banks safety by setting up a spatial competition model with four different types of 
agents: insiders, shareholders, depositors and a supervisory banking authority. The 
Author concludes that the introduction of the mandatory disclosure requirements, such 
as the III Pillar of the Basel II framework, may improve the safety of the banking 
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system and enhance the effectiveness of the (I Pillar) minimum regulatory capital 
requirements. 
Another research conducted by Castren, Fitzpatrick and Sydow in 2009 focuses on 
credit exposure and other information on loan loss provisions in the annual reports of 
large European banking groups concerning the period from 2004 to 2005. The Authors 
analyzed the impact of macro-economic shocks on the Value at Risk (VaR), concluding 
that the shocks to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have the most impact on credit risk of 
banks. In addition, the paper tests the information concerning the III Pillar of Basel II 
and found that disclosure was not complete, so banks were not fully compliant to the 
framework. It is the expectation of the researchers that with the implementation of IFRS 
7 and the III Pillar of Basel II, these disclosures will increase the qualitative and the 
quantitative information provided by banks. 
Studies before and after the adoption of high quality standards have reported conflicting 
levels of effect on risk management disclosures. PriceWaterhouse-Coopers (2006, 2008) 
found that IFRS 7 does not significantly affect the disclosure of risk management 
activities. However, Bischof (2009) and Woods et al. (2008) found otherwise.  
Bischof (2009) claims that the introduction of IAS/IFRS that have increased the level of 
disclosure quality with better consequences on financial reporting transparency.  
The aforementioned Author has argued that the introduction of IFRS 7 in the European 
banking system has had a positive impact not only on the quantity of information 
disclosed, but only on its quality. He has focused only on banks because the impact of 
the new standard is stronger in this sector than others because financial industries hold 
almost the 90% of financial instruments in their assets. A sample of 171 banks has 
investigated in 28 European Countries in a period from 2006 to 2007 (first year of IFRS 
7 introduction). In a first step, only the quantitative impact has analyzed counting the 
number of pages in the risk report. In a second step, it has been analyzed the disclosure 
quality through an univariate analysis.  
Overall, evidence shows that disclosure is far from perfect, indeed not all banks are 
complied with IFRS 7. 
38 
  
 
Indeed, Drago and Muzzacca (2005) have investigated the level of risk disclosure in the 
Italian banks. Their conclusions emphasizes a lack of risk information because Italian 
banks perceive the expected benefits of the disclosure as minor than the costs. Similarly, 
Linsley et al. (2006) criticize that disclosure provided by IFRS 7 is were essentially 
qualitative. 
Also Malinconico (2007) analysis some informative characteristics related to financial 
risks in the Italian banking sector and concludes that auditors enhance disclosure 
commitments. 
Maffei (2009) conducts a study on IFRS 7 in the Italian banking sector showing that 
these entities disclose sufficient information about the explanations of financial 
reporting and the reported amounts. The disclosure however is poor when it comes to 
administering information on risks, their impact on the balance sheet accounts and the 
possible ways of managing them.  
Woods, Dowd and Humphrey (2008) researched the impact of market risk disclosure on 
the top 25 multinational banks in the world from 2000 to 2006. The aim of their study 
was to contribute evidence to the quality and to the convergence of the international 
reporting standards. The results shown that disclosure has slightly increased over time, 
but, comparing IFRS and local GAAP, evidence points out that disclosure on market 
risk decrease under IFRS. 
Some studies (Yong et al., 2005 and Bischof, 2009) argue that only a small number of 
banks disclosed VaR results before and after the adoption of IFRS 7; others (Woods et 
al., 2004; Woods et al., 2008) report that disclosure deficiencies persisted after the 
adoption of IFRS 7 with consequent lack of transparency and less comparability of 
financial reports. 
Boussanni et al. (2008) investigate liquidity risk disclosure in European banks finding 
that disclosures about contingency planning and internal controls were insubstantial and 
incomplete.  
On the contrary, Frolov (2007) and Bischof (2009) argue that only credit risk 
disclosures presented optimal levels of mandatory compliance. 
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Oliveira et al. (2011) focus on credit risk and liquidity risk disclosure finding that the 
former is characterized by different time bands used in ageing analyses of past due 
assets and lack of detailed description of associated collateral; the latter is characterized 
by use of generic liquidity risk management statements, misaligned liquidity risk 
exposure and qualitative disclosures regarding management strategies to deal with those 
exposures, and the absence of sensitivity analysis of liquidity risk exposure. 
On the contrary, Amoako and Asante (2013), and Hossain (2014) focus on compliance 
and conclude that banks are good at complying with the standard in the emerging 
markets of Ghana and Bangladesh, respectively.  
More recently, Zango et al. (2015) conduct a study on banks IFRS 7 compliance in 
another emerging country (Nigeria), showing high level of compliance and positively 
relates with risk management committee effectiveness.  
Finally, a study by Papa (2016) shows that, in general, the compliance with IFRS 7 
disclosure requirements by financial statement preparers is inconsistent and incomplete. 
In many cases, these IFRS 7 risk disclosures have limited informational content that is 
decision-useful.  
The Authors, through the administration of a questionnaire to a pool of 300 Chartered 
Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute members, has identified the weaknesses of the 
standard: 1) risk disclosures are difficult to understand; 2) qualitative disclosures 
provided are uninformative; 3) users have low confidence in reliability of quantitative 
disclosures; 4) there is low consistency and comparability of disclosures; 5) top-down 
and integrated messaging on overall risk management is missing. 
Overall, it seems mainly that the adoption, i.e. of IAS/IFRS, has brought a greater flow 
of risk-related information, but has not ensured increased transparency. 
Potential reasons are that IAS/IFRS are not aligned with the way financial companies 
manage risk, and that they are not bank-oriented standards (Oliveira et al., 2011).  
The problem is that IAS/IFRS focus only on financial risk, ignoring other kinds of risks 
(such as operational risks) faced by banks. This misalignment can culminate in the 
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dispersal of risk reporting practices throughout an annual report, rendering them 
incomparable, and imprecise (Woods and Marginson, 2004; Woods et al., 2008). 
Hence, the contribution of this thesis to the literature review consists in an improvement 
of value relevance of IFRS 7 in the European banking system. Indeed, this topic, on the 
best of our knowledge, is not fully studied in the value relevance field. 
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Chapter 2: Value relevance of financial instruments disclosure 
2.1 Value relevance studies 
Value relevance studies are included in “capital market research in accounting”. The 
first studies date back to the late 60's with Ball and Brown (1968), and Beaver (1968). 
Their studies were pioneering because introduced the positive accounting theory (PAT). 
Over the past few years, even under the new international rules, studies on relevance 
value gradually increased. Some have tried to follow the impact of IAS/IFRS on 
accounting values, others to assess the relevance of accounting for intangible in order to 
understand the different areas of research, the purposes and methods of analysis 
adopted, it is appropriate to recall some classifications drawn up by various authors. 
Referring to the purposes of the analysis, value relevance studies can be classified into 
two main categories: “Associations Studies” and “Event Studies” (Mechelli, 2013). 
The “Association Studies” are to test the relation between the market value of a given 
company, expressed by the prices or stock returns, and the book values. As for the 
“Event Studies”, however, are to test whether the communication of new information 
could have a significant impact in their markets. 
This study is among the association study, as I discuss in chapter 3. 
Another classification was proposed by Holthausen and Watts (2001). The Authors, to 
facilitate their analysis, grouped the studies on the value relevance into three classes: 
relative association studies, incremental association studies (both belonging to 
association studis) and marginal information studies (belonging to event studies). 
The association studies analyze the relation between book values and market values 
thanks to R
2
 indicator
2
. The higher the R
2
, the more value relevant is the information 
disclosed. 
                                                          
2 
R
2
 is a statistical measure that indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that is 
predictable from the independent variable. R
2 
= 1- 
𝑆𝑆𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡
 that is the ratio between the sum of squares of 
residuals and the total sum of squares 
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The incremental association studies aim to analyze whether a given book value has 
greater explanatory power than the other variables included in the model. From a 
statistical point of view, a value is considered significant if the regression coefficient 
estimated results to be different from zero. 
In the category called “marginal information content studies”, there are those analyzes 
to determine whether the occurrence of an event will generate a reaction in the markets, 
and therefore affect the company's value. 
Another interesting classification was provided by Beaver (2002), who has developed a 
classification considering as a factor in the empirical models used in searches. The 
author identifies two possible categories where it is possible to classify the different 
types of studies: “Earnings only approach” and “Balance sheet approach”. 
In the first, they fit those studies aimed at analyzing the association between market 
values and operating income. In the “Balance sheet approach”, taking as reference the 
Ohlson model, there are surveys that consider the association between accounting and 
income values with the company's market value. 
Liu and Liu (2007) define vale relevance as the capacity of accounting number to 
incorporate information about stock prices. 
Beisland (2009), however, identifies four categories in which to place the research: 
a) Value Relevance of earnings and other flow measures, such as net income and cash 
flows. 
b) Value Relevance of equity and other stock measures, such as the book value of 
equity. 
c) Value Relevance over time. Here we put all of those investigations to consider any 
change of importance of financial reporting over the years. 
d) Value Relevance of alternative accounting methods. Here are those research aimed at 
analyzing the different relevance of book values, depending on the accounting rules 
adopted. 
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Hellstrom (2006), instead, prefers to make a classification considering as a 
discriminating factor in the calculation methods of the value relevance. The Author, in 
fact, distinguishes the studies between “signaling perspective” and “measurement 
perspective”. 
In the first perspective, we find that research that consider the market reaction to the 
occurrence of certain events (in this context, reference is made to the disclosure of 
economic-financial information); in the latter, however, we find research that explore 
the statistical association between equity and book value prices. 
Overall, beyond the different classifications proposed by different Authors, which will 
surely help to better understand the studies on value relevance, it seems that the 
classification more used is between “Event Studies” and “Association Studies". 
Furtehrmore, there are also some definition in the literature about value relevance. The 
most common definition is that provided by Barth (2000). According to the Author, a 
book value is value relevant if it contains information that affect market decisions. It is 
clear that, according to this view, the variable which tests the existence of a statistically 
significant relation with the book values is the price. 
According to other Scholars (Aboody et al., 2002) the “value relevance is the mapping 
from accounting information to intrinsic value, i.e. the present value of expected future 
Dividends conditional on all available information” (p.966). 
As aforementioned, many Scholars prefer the definition provided by Barth because the 
value of economic capital is a factor estimated based on discounting the expected results 
of the company, the price, however, is the result of supply and demand (Mechelli, 
2013). 
A definition similar to that of Barth is provided by Holthausen and Watts (2001), but 
unlike Barth, the Authors argue that value relevance research does not provide insights 
into questions of interest to standard setters. In Holthausen and Watts’ view value 
relevance research is “useful to standard setters only if the underlying theories are 
descriptive (in the sense of explaining and predicting accounting, standard setting and 
valuation). Without descriptive theories to interpret the empirical associations, the 
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value-relevance literature’s associations have limited implications or inferences for 
standard setting; they are just associations”3.  
In response to the aforementioned Authors, Barth et al. (2001) issue a paper explaining 
why value relevance studies offer important insights to standard setters. First of all, 
although an important impediment keeping the value-relevance literature from 
contributing more to standard-setting debates is its lack of a theory that has some 
potential to explain accounting and standard setting, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) articulates its concept of accounting and standard setting in its 
Conceptual Framework. Indeed, relevance and reliability are the two primary criteria 
the FASB uses for choosing among accounting alternatives, so value relevance 
represent one approach to operationalizing the FASB’s stated criteria of relevance and 
reliability (Barth et al., 2001, p. 4). 
Another definition of value relevance is given by the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (ICAEW): “value relevance studies look at the relationship 
between financial reporting information and share prices or changes in share prices” 
(ICAEW, 2015). 
In this work, I adopt the definition by Barth because value relevance research provides 
insights into questions of interest to standard setters and users because a primary focus 
of the FASB and investors is equity investment. In addition, the results provided by 
value relevance studies are based on strong empirical models, despite their simplifying 
assumptions. 
2.2 Value relevance of accounting principles: a literature review 
As early as the 60s arise the effects of dissatisfaction than previous research settings. 
The change in pressure led to that which will be defined “empirical revolution” (Wells, 
1976).  
As aforementioned, the positive accounting theory (PAT) deals extensively with to 
value relevance studies thanks to Ball and Brown study (1968). They examine the 
                                                          
3
 Holthausen, R. W., & Watts, R. L. (2001). The relevance of the value-relevance literature for financial 
accounting standard setting, p.2 
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information content of accounting information in relation to the equities market prices. 
The hypothesis at the base of the survey is that if the financial information is useful to 
financial market, then it must be incorporated in the stock price. Otherwise, or the 
information disclosed is irrelevant or has already been incorporated previously in 
investors' decisions. The market price are therefore considered indicators of corporate 
disclosure usefulness. 
Similarly, Beaver (1968) studied the relation between earnings announcements and 
stock market prices. In both works, the “if” and “how” information on the financial 
results are reflected in equity prices is carried out starting from an experimental 
analysis, using the analytical models developed in the fields of Economics and Finance. 
The PAT is initially coined by Watts and Zimmerman in 1978. The Authors give the 
right view of the Agency Theory problems argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
These problems arise because one party to a potential transaction has more information 
than another (Arrow, 1963; Ackerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975). Authors such 
as  Gonedes et al. (1976) and Godenes (1978) suggest that this problem is applicable to 
accounting information. 
From these approaches emerges the contractual nature of the relationships that link the 
parties involved in the company and the context of asymmetric information with 
management that is in advantage position over outsiders (investors and lenders 
especially) which can not directly observe the actual achievement process corporate 
performance. 
In this theoretical framework, an important contribution by Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
has highlighted the importance of PAT. They have investigated the relation between 
accounting numbers and market values based on the residual income, concluding that 
market value depends on book values and expected earnings. This study has lead to the 
value relevance ones that analyze different models to verify the relation between book 
values and market values. 
According to many Scholars, it can possible define a financial reporting as transparent if 
it allows readers to understand the reporting firm’s financial performance and financial 
position (Barth and Schipper, 2008). It can possible investigate this characteristic 
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through 1) investment analysts’ forecasting ability; 2) value relevance and 3) accounting 
quality. 
I focus on value relevance because the aim of this study is to analyze if investors 
perceive as relevant financial instruments disclosure. In other words, if the information 
disclosed suggests them appropriate risk levels to their investment decisions. 
There have been so many studies looking at the effects on value relevance of mandatory 
IFRS adoption in relation to equity markets (ICAEW, 2015, p.31). 
Platikanova and Nobes (2006) look at the information asymmetry component (AIC) of 
the bidask spread to assess value relevance in European countries from 2003 to 2005. 
They conclude that the AIC component of the bid-ask spread does not decrease after 
IFRS adoption. 
Wang et al. (2008) find evidence that the value relevance of earnings increases after 
mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Morais and Curto (2009) compare the value relevance of net income and equity book 
value under local GAAP and voluntary IFRS adoption (2000–2004) and under 
mandatory IFRS adoption (2005). They find that the value relevance of financial 
information during the period companies applied mandatory IAS/IFRS is higher than 
for the period during which they applied local accounting standards. 
Devalle et al. (2010) report that value relevance of earnings has increased under IFRS, 
while value relevance of book value of equity has decreased. 
Agostino et al. (2011) have investigated the value relevance of IFRS in the European 
banking industry and find that the value relevance of equity book value increases for 
banks that are larger and that are rated (i.e., by credit ratings agencies). 
Azzali et al. (2012) have etsted the value relevance of IAS/IFRS in Italy. Their results 
show the value relevance of book value of equity and ROE increases with IAS/IFRS, 
while the Other Comprhensive Income (OCI) is not value relevant for investors. 
Similar to this study, Bonetti et al. (2012) have investigated the relevance of IFRS 7 but 
they focus only on one type of risk (the currency one) in a single country (Italy), while 
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this thesis goals is to test the value relevance of financial instruments risk disclosure 
(i.e. credi risk, market risk and liquidity risk), as required by IFRS 7 in the European 
setting. 
There are also many studies that do not consider value relevant the IAS/IFRS 
introduction, such as Aubert and Grudnitski (2011) who does not find value relevant the 
information produced under IFRS.  
Similarly, Paananen and Lin (2009) have demonstrated that earnings and book value of 
equity are becoming less value relevant during the mandatory IFRS period in Germany 
from 2000 to 2006. 
Oliveira et al. (2010) find that IAS/ IFRS do not have effect on the value relevance of 
the book value of equity, while the value relevance of earnings decreases with 
IAS/IFRS. 
Karampinis and Hevas (2011) have claimed that do not have sufficient empirical 
evidence to support that mandatory IFRS adoption had a positive impact on the value 
relevance of accounting earnings reported by Greek firms. 
Barth et al. (2011) find that US GAAP amounts are more value relevant than IFRS 
amounts before and after their adoption. 
Also Christensen et al. (2015) find no improvement in value relevance for mandatory 
IFRS adopters in Germany. 
Forthermore, there are many studies that have focused on the value relevance of 
disclosure, like Banghoj and Plenborg (2008) that tested the voluntary disclosure in 
annual report in order to investigate if this type of information has a positive impact 
with actual and expected results. The Autors concluded that voluntary disclosure is not 
value relevant. In contrast with them, Lundholm and Myers (2002), and Gelb and 
Zarowin (2002) have demonstrated that voluntary disclosure is value relevant for 
investors. 
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Other Scholars, such as Clarkson et al. (2011), have investigated the differences in value 
relevance between code law and common law showing similar levels of value 
relevance. 
In the American field, instead, Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1996), have analyzed the 
value relevance of fair value, as required by SFAS 107 in a period between 1993 and 
1994. In contrast with Nelson and Eccher (1996), the aforementioned Scholars have 
concluded that SFAS 107 has positively affected the banks’ stock prices. 
Also Khurana e Kim (2003) have checked the value relevance of fair value and 
historical cost and have argued that for bank holding companies, historical cost is more 
value relevant than fair value, while, fair value is more value relevant in he case of 
available for trading assets. 
Barth et al. (2014) look at information disclosed for 2004, on domestic GAAP and 
IFRS. The sample is divided into three country groups: English, Scandinavian and 
French/German. The authors conclude that the net income and book value adjustments 
to IFRS for 2004 are value relevant, in particular for financial firms. 
2.3 Review of empirical models 
In order to test the value relevance in the accounting field, Scholars use statistical 
methods based on regression. The dependent variable is represented by market values 
(prices, returns, etc.), while the independent variables are the annual report’s values. 
Scholars use to adopt two different models: price models, return models and balance 
sheet models. 
Price models investigate the relation between market prices and accounting values. 
Return models examines the relation between returns and accounting values. Balance 
sheet models are very similar to the price model, but does not include earnings as 
independent variables. 
The most important model among price models has been developed by Ohlson (1995), 
while the return model most used has been developed by Easton and Harris (1991). 
What is the best one is a difficult choice because many Scholars argue that the two 
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models are complementary, others prefer price ones, others believes that returns ones 
have less econometric problems. 
Generally speaking, price models have more econometric problems because of the scale 
effect problems produced by a heterogeneous sample in terms of size. 
In addition, price model goals is to test if an accounting number is relevant in firms 
valuation. Instead, the return models test the timeliness of un accounting information 
(Kothari and Zimmerman, 1995). Regarding balance sheet models, it is impossible to 
assume that all firms in the sample have returns in line with the market, so their use is 
questionable. 
2.3.1 Price models 
The assumptions of Ohlson model are: 1) the value of an enterprise is equal to the net 
present value of expected dividends; 2) the clean surplus relation is satisfied; 3) the 
abnormal returns have a linear autoregressive process. 
In developing his model, Ohlson adopts Discounted Dividend Model (DDM): the value 
of a company turns out to be equal to the present value of expected dividends. This 
assumption may be expressed through the following relation: 
 
Pt = ∑ 𝑅𝑓
∞
𝜏=1  
– τ
 Et [dt+τ]                                            [a] 
Where: 
Pt = market value of the company at time t 
dt+τ = net dividends paid at time t 
Rf = yield on risk-free investments 
Et [dt+τ] = expected value based on available information 
 
Ohlson, to simplify the model, assumes to operate in a neutral environment at risk, so as 
to use a risk-free rate. 
A second assumption underlying the model is the principle of clean surplus relation. On 
the basis of this principle the income in a given is equal to the difference between the 
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net assets of the same year and the net assets of the previous period, net of inter-
company transactions and members. 
Ohlson, thanks to the clean surplus relation and to Dividend Discount Model, can 
express the company's value in an alternative way. Taking into account the net assets 
and the present value of expected abnormal earnings. 
May be identified two groups of studies that have reformulated this model. The first 
includes all those publications that have attempted to empirically validate the 
assumptions of Ohlson applying theoretical models to listed companies, with the aim of 
verifying the existence of a possible relationship based on experience and theoretical 
models. The second compares results of the empirical obtained with other valuation 
models. 
Ohlson shows that are already known in the accounting literature the principle that the 
value of a company is equal to the present value of future dividends and the principle of 
clean surplus. Together, they allow to define the economic value of an entity. 
This theory is summarized in the following equation: 
 
Pt = yt + ∑ 𝑅𝑓
∞
𝜏=1  
– τ
 Et [xt+τ] 
–a                                         
       [b] 
Where 
[xt+τ] 
–a 
it is abnormal income in the period from t+1 to ∞. 
 
According to this equation, the value of a company is being equal to the book value of 
equity more the abnormal returns. 
It is considered normal a return at least equal to the cost of capital. 
The third and final assumption of the basic concerns of the model is about the abnormal 
returns. 
Ohlson is believed what abnormal returns follow a autoregressive trend, i.e. that the 
abnormal return let those related to the previous period. On the basis of this assumption, 
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abnormal returns depend both the previous period and some pieces of relevant 
information that has not already have an economic consequence. 
As aforementioned, it is possible calculate the following equation: 
 
       x
a
t+1 = ω x
a
t + vt + ε1t+1 
vt+1 = γ vt + ε2t+1                                                                                         [c] 
 
where: 
ω is the variable that binds the abnormal return (or excess return) for the period t whit 
those subsequent. 
vt is relevant information, but not yet recognized in the annual report as they are the 
future economic event. 
γ is the variable that binds the period t whit those subsequent. 
ε is the residual. 
 
According to Ohlson, the parameters ω and γ are constant over time as employees from 
the economic environment and the accounting rules adopted. 
As noted by Kothari (2001), the real importance of the autoregressive process of super-
profits, is that competitive pressure brings the excess return to its normal level. Thus, 
the stronger the competitive pressure the greater will be the rate of reduction of excess 
return and consequently, the lower will be ω. 
As aforementioned, the irst formulation of the Ohlson model is the following: 
 
Pt = yt + a1 x
a
t + a2 vt                                                  [d] 
 
Where: 
a1 = 
𝜔
𝑅𝑓−𝜔
 ≥ 0 
a2 = 
𝑅𝑓
(𝑅𝑓−𝜔)(𝑅𝑓−𝛾)
 ≥ 0 
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This equation indicates that the market value of a company is equal to the book value of 
equity correct for the current profitability, (the latter measured by the abnormal returns) 
and other information that modify the expected profitability. 
The model proposed by Ohlson, was considered to be of major importance and has been 
the subject of several revisions over the years by Scholars. One of the major 
reformulations of this model is represented by the following relationship: 
 
MVit = a0 + a1BVit + a2NIit + uit                              [e] 
 
Where: 
MVit is the market value of an entity in the period t 
BVit is the book value of equity of an entity in the period t 
NIit is the net income of an entity in the period t 
uit is the error 
 
A variant of this equation can be obtained by dividing each term by the number of 
outstanding shares, thus having the following other equation: 
 
Pit = β0 + β1 BVPSit + β2 NIPSit + εit                                              [f] 
 
Where: 
Pit is the stock price of an entity in the period t 
BVPSit is the book value of equity per share of an entity in the period t 
NIPSit is the net income per share of an entity in the period t 
εit is the residual 
 
It can be observed that, while the Ohlson model aims at analyzing a single company, its 
reformulations, however, are concerned with different companies. 
A second difference concerns the variable “other information”. Indeed, this variable is 
present in the Ohlson model, buti t is often omitted by Scholars in their analyzes. If this 
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variable had a significant impact in its assessment of the company and a strong 
correlation with the other variables included in the model, its omission could lead to a 
distorione values and consequently also the regressive coefficients β can be distorted. 
Finally, a third difference relates to the dividend paid in a particular year. Recall that 
while the Ohlson model is based on Dividen Discount Model (DDM) that the company's 
value is the present value of expected dividends, this same variable, however, is omitted 
in the reformulations made by the researchers as part of their analysis. 
As in the case of the variable “other information”, if these dividends had the more or 
less significant correlations with other variables in the model, their absence may cause 
distortions in the values of the two coefficients β (Hand and Landsman, 1998). 
2.3.2 Returns models 
Among the models for studies on value relevance in addition to the "Price Models", 
mainly represented by the Ohlson model (1995), there are also the "Return Models", 
models that try to check for a possible association between the returns of the shares and 
the annual report values. In this context, the model that took on greater significance, is 
certainly the one proposed by Easton and Harris in 1991. 
The goal of their analysis was to check whether the level of income, divided by the 
price of the shares at beginning of year, is relevant in the evaluation of the association 
between returns and income. In other words, the Authors were trying to determine 
whether the performance of the shares (the dependent variable) depends to income and 
its variations (independent variables). 
At the basis of their studies, there is the idea that the book value of equity and the 
market value of the variables are "stock", that is, variables that indicate the shareholder 
wealth. The variables "flow" used are the yields and income, or its variation divided by 
the share price at the beginning of a financial year (A/P-1).  
Their study is based on the book value valuation model and the earnings valuation 
model. The former checks whether the market value, represented by the stock price, 
depends on a book value of equity. In this case they take into account the relation 
between variables "stock." This relation is represented by the following equation: 
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Pjt = BVjt + ujt                                              [g] 
Where: 
Pjt is the price per share of an entity in the period t 
BVjt is entity the book value of equity in the period t 
ujt is the difference between Pjt and BVjt 
 
The difference between the price per share and the book value of equity may be caused 
by several factors, such as the adoption of conservative principles that tend to reduce the 
value of the equity or result from the presence of information embedded in the stock 
price but they have not yet had an accounting event. 
The relation between flow variables, however, is given by the variation of the same 
observed in the previous equation: 
 
∆Pjt = ∆BVjt + ‘ujt                                              [h] 
 
Where: 
∆BVjt is the variation entity the book value of equity in the period t 
This book value of equity variation can be summarized as follow: 
 
∆BVjt = Ajt - djt                                                [i] 
 
Where: 
Ajt is the earning per share of an entity from period t-1 to period t 
djt is the dividend paid by an entity from period t-1 to period t 
 
In this case we are referring to the principle of the "clean surplus relations", according 
to which the change in shareholders' equity is equal to the income earned net of 
transitions made by the company to shareholders (in this case, the dividends). 
Substituting in the equation [h] the equivalent value of ΔBVjt and dividing all the terms 
for the price of shares at beginning of year, we get: 
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(∆𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝑑𝑗𝑡)
𝑃𝑗𝑡−1
 = Ajt / Pjt-1 + ujt                                                [j] 
 
The earnings valuation model is an alternative view, in which considering the price per 
share as a multiple of the same income. The equation is the follow: 
 
Pjt + djt = ρAjt - vjt                                                     [k] 
 
Where: 
Pjt is the price per share 
djt is the dividend paid for each share 
ρ is the multiple, equal to the reciprocal of the expected rate of return 
Ajt is the earning per share 
vjt is the error 
 
Assuming that there are no dividends paid to t-1 time but only at time t, the equation 
becomes: 
(∆𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝑑𝑗𝑡)
𝑃𝑗𝑡−1
 = ρ[∆Ajt /Pjt-1] + v’jt                                              [l] 
 
Where: 
(∆𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝑑𝑗𝑡)
𝑃𝑗𝑡−1
 is the return of an entity 
[∆Ajt /Pjt-1 is the earning divided by the price of the shares at the beginning of period t-1 
 
From the equation [l] shows a linear relation between changes in income, divided by the 
share price at the beginning of the period, and the returns over the period. 
Scholars, noting that the share price of many companies is a function both of the book 
values and earnings, combine both valuation models (book value valuation model and 
earnings valuation model) in the assessment of prices (returns) of an entity. By 
combining the expressions [j] and [l], we have: 
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(∆𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝑑𝑗𝑡)
𝑃𝑗𝑡−1
 = kρ[∆Ajt /Pjt-1] + (1-k) [Ajt /Pjt-1] +wjt                                  [m] 
 
Where: 
k is the factor that weighs the contribution of the change in earnings compared to the 
levels of earnings, in explaining stock returns. 
 
The expression [m] is the most widely used model by Scholars in the course of their 
analysis. 
The model proposed by the Authors is based on the idea of being able to evaluate the 
equity returns through a weighted arithmetic mean values of different nature, because 
some assets are better evaluated through capital values, others, instead, through income 
source values. 
2.3.3 Balance sheet models 
The balance sheet model has been used by some Authors since the second half of the 
80s, such as Barth (1991) and Landsman (1986)
4
. It is very similar to the price model, 
but does not include earnings as independent variables. 
The basic assumption of the model is that the value of an enterprise can be expressed by 
the sum of the value of assets and liabilities: 
 
MKT = MVA + MVL                                                 [n] 
 
Where: 
MKT is the market value of an entity 
MVA is the market value of assets 
MVL is the market value of liabilities 
 
                                                          
4 
 Barth, M. E. (1991). Relative measurement errors among alternative pension asset and liability 
measures. Accounting Review, 433-463; Landsman, W. (1986). An empirical investigation of pension 
fund property rights. Accounting Review, 662-691. 
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The most common form in which this methodological proposal is used in the traditional 
researches on the value relevance is the following: 
 
MKTjt = α0 + α1 Ajt + α2 Ljt + α3 Ijt + εit                                  [o] 
 
Where: 
MKTjt is the market value of an entity in the period t 
Ajt is book value of assets 
Ljt is book value of liabilities 
Ijt is book value of the item to study in order to verify the value relevance. 
 
If the coefficient α3 is significantly different from zero, the variable is value relevant for 
financial market. 
An important limit of balance sheet model is that assets and liabilities of balance sheet 
do not reflect values af all assets and all liabilities, which include potential synergies 
and other intabgibles that are not reflected in firm value (Barth, 2000). 
In addition, this model holds if the firm is earnings competitive rate of return on its net 
assets (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). 
In order to avoid the aforementioned problems, some Scholar have proposed to add the 
goodwill amoung the independent variables to summerize items’ synergies, but 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) have argued thatthe introduction of goodwill makes the 
model hold tautologically. In this case, ondependnet variables are often included in the 
regression to proxy for goodwill, but goodwill is not a separete economic asset, being 
merely the difference between the market vale of equity and the value of net assets 
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001, p. 51). In other words, only if the company produces 
returns in line with the cost of capital, the asset information is sufficient to explain its 
market value. 
It follows that it is impossible to assume that all firms in the sample have returns in line 
with the market, so the use of the balance sheet model is questionable. 
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For this reason, it is encessary to insert also earnings to test the value relevance in order 
to enhance those assets or those synergies that create abnormal returns on investments.  
2.4 Background on the value relevance of financial instruments in the 
banking sector  
In this section, I analyze the literature about the value relevance of financial 
instruments, topic that has been widely used in recent years due to: 1) the increased 
globalization of financial markets that has claimed for more standardization of 
accounting practices at international level; 2) the significant increase in international 
investments has necessitated the need for more reliable and informative financial 
statements on a global basis (Anandajaran et al., 2010). 
The majority of studies on value relevance of financial instruments have been conducted 
in the Amercan setting. The most studied is the banking sector because the majority of 
its assets consists of financial instruments, therefore, by its nature, it is exposed to a 
massive amount of financial risks. 
Following the studies that have dealt with the relevance of financial instruments in the 
banking sector. 
Venkatachalam (1996) has investigated the value relevance of fair value banks’ off 
balance derivatives used for risk management purposes, as required by SFAS 119. The 
Author document that this type of information in the annual report is value relevant for 
financial market, in particular he has analyzed the disaggregated disclosure on 
contractual/notional amounts for off balance sheet instruments suggesting that there is 
value for disaggregated information. Furthermore, the study has given evidence about 
the association between fair value gains and losses on risk management derivatives and 
fair value gains and losses for on balance sheet items, suggesting that only 47% of 
banks use derivatives for hedging purposes. Similar evidence on off balance sheet 
derivatives are conducted by Schrand (1997) who, using a sample of publicly traded 
savings and loan associations, provides evidence that off balance sheet derivatives 
activities are positively associated with lower stock price interest rate sensitivity. 
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Barth et al. (2006) has tested the value relevance of fair value disclosure on financial 
instruments under SFAS 107 in the banking industry. The study has revealed that the 
fair value of securities provide relevant information for financial market. In particular, 
the fair value disclosure of loans provides relevant information for investors if it is 
supplemented with those about the interest sensitivity of the loans and about the bank’s 
financial health. 
Similarly, Eccher et al. (1996) have examined the value relevance of fair value data 
disclosed under SFAS 107 by holding banks. In other words, the study’s goal is whether 
fair value disclosures mandated by SFAS 107 have incremental association with market 
value over and above information disclosed in banks' financial statements prior to SFAS 
107. The Athors have found that the fair value of net loans has a weaker association 
with market to book ratio than does the fair value of securities. While the off balance 
sheet instruments are value relevant in limited settings, Authors find no significance for 
the fair value of deposits due to the exclusion of core deposit intangibles in the 
valuation of them under SFAS 107. 
Nelson (1996) has evaluated the association between the market value of banks’ 
common equity and fair value estimates disclosed under SFAS 107. The results suggest 
that only the reported fair values of investment securities have incremental explanatory 
power relative to book value. There are not reliable evidence of incremental explanatory 
power for the fair value disclosures of loans, deposits, long term debt or net off balance 
sheet financial instruments. In addition, the Author has argued that studies which 
demonstrate the poor quality of the disclosed information are affected by measurement 
error or management manipulation, main responsible for its limited usefulness to 
investors. 
The study conducted by Choi (2007) examines the association between a firm’s bank 
dependence and the value relevance of the income statement by investigating the 
income statement conservatism of firms with bank loans. The Author concludes that the 
value relevance of the income statement is increasing in a firm’s bank dependence. 
Moreover, the usefulness of the income statement varies with a firm’s bank dependence, 
indicating that the value relevance of the income statement is a function of a firm’s debt 
financing decision. 
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Anandajaran et al. (2010) demonstrate that value relevance is affected by 
‘‘transparency’’ or disclosure requirements of a country’s standards boards. To measure 
transparency they use an index developed for each country by the Center for 
International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The Authors analyze other 
macro variables, such as corporate and legal environment, financing and economic 
environment, market competition, bank regulatory, relative risk. They find that the 
value relevance was more significant in countries that required greater disclosure of 
financial information and for riskier banks. 
Hassan and Mohd-Salehn (2010) investigate whether financial instrument disclosure 
requirements are value relevant in Malesya. Overall, results indicate that firms should 
provide high quality information since it is useful for investment decision, but financial 
instrument disclosure is less value relevant in the period when the standard becomes 
mandatory. 
Other studies focused on the value relevance of recognition vs disclosure. With no 
claim to completeness, Ahmed et al. (2006) have conducted a study on the value 
relevance of banks’ derivative financial instruments recognized and disclosed prior and 
after SFAS 133, in order to demonstrate that recognition and disclosure are not 
substitute. They conclude that the valuation coefficients on recognized derivatives are 
significant whereas the valuation coefficients on disclosed derivatives are not 
significant. In contrast with Ahmed et al., Bratten et al. (2013) provide evidence that 
disclosed items are not processed differently from recognized items when the 
disclosures are salient. Kun Yu, instead, examines whether institutional ownership and 
analyst following affect the value relevance of disclosed versus recognized pension 
liabilities under SFAS 158 and conclude that the value relevance of disclosed off 
balance sheet pension liabilities increases. Lastly, Muller et al. (2015) examine pricing 
differences across recognized and disclosed fair value using a sample composed by 
European real estate firms reporting under IFRS. Consistent with prior research, they 
predict and find a lower association between equity prices and disclosure about 
investment property fair values. 
Other studies, instead focus on the risk relevance of financial instruments disclosure. 
For example, Jorion (2002) provides preliminary evidence on the informativeness of 
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VaR disclosures about financial instruments exposed to market risk. He has investigated 
the relation between the trading VaR disclosed by a small sample of U.S. commercial 
banks and the subsequent variability of their trading revenues. The empirical results 
suggest that VaR disclosures are relevant in that they predict the variability of trading 
revenues. Thus, analysts and investors can use VaR disclosures to compare the risk 
profiles of banks' trading portfolios. In addition, Liu et al. (2004) find that these results 
are more significant for the largest, more technically sophisticated banks that are better 
able to estimate VaR, and they have strengthened over time as VaR becomes better 
measured by firms and understood by users of financial reports. Similar conclusions 
have been argued by Lim and Mui-Siang Tan (2007) who argue that VaR disclosures 
provide useful information to investors in assessing the informativeness of earnings. 
Hodder (2002) finds that commercial banks’ interest rate sensitivity disclosures are not 
associated with future changes in income or fair value, conditioning on actual changes 
in market factors, but that their simpler regulatory repricing gap disclosures are so 
associated. She interprets her results as suggesting that information about risk may be 
lost due to banks’ modeling assumptions embedded in the estimation of these sensitivity 
disclosures. 
More recently, however, Pérignon and Smith (2010) find that banks’ VaR does not 
predict the variance of trading income, a change from prior findings that they ascribe to 
banks’ increasing tendency to estimate VaR using historical simulation. 
With regard to the value relevance of financial instruments affected by credit risk Bhat 
et al. (2012) provide evidence that banks with better credit risk modeling disclosures 
(estimation of credit loss parameters based on current loan status and underwriting 
criteria) on average have desirable attributes, suggestive of lower risk, so they are value 
relevant for financial market. 
Regarding liquidity risk, instead, most accounting research examines samples that 
include no financial firms and does not focus on financial instruments, so for this reason 
we will not be investigated in this study. 
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2.5 The development of hypotheses  
The capital market research topics of primary interest to academics is the test of market 
efficiency with respect to accounting information, fundamental analysis  and 
accounting-based valuation, and value relevance of financial reporting (Kothari, 2001).  
According to Kothari (2001) accounting reports reflect information that influences 
security prices, although not on a timely basis. He categorizes the demand of this 
research into five main areas: (i) methodological capital markets research, (ii) 
evaluation of alternative accounting performance measures, (iii) valuation and 
fundamental analysis research, (iv) tests of market efficiency, and (v) value relevance of 
disclosures according to various financial accounting standards and economic 
consequences of new accounting standards. These research areas arise from PAT  
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) that predicts that the use of accounting numbers in 
compensation and debt contracts and in the political process affects a firm’s accounting 
choices. Indeed, they state that the objective of accounting theory is to explain and 
predict accounting practice. 
Following Keynes’ (1891) definition of positive science as “a body of systematized 
knowledge concerning what is”, Friedman (1953, p.7) describes positive science as “the 
development of a ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not 
truistic) predictions about phenomena yet to be observed”. 
Most accounting research since Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) is always 
more positive and less normative. These Authors are the former who introduce the value 
relevance studies according to PAT. They examine the information content of 
accounting information in relation to the equities market prices. The hypothesis at the 
base of the survey is that if the financial information is useful to financial market, then it 
must be incorporated in the stock price. Otherwise, or the information disclosed is 
irrelevant or has already been incorporated previously in investors’ decisions. The 
market price are therefore considered indicators of corporate disclosure usefulness. 
Watts and Zimmerman’s work was the impulse for other important studies conducted 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Ross (1977) that altered the course of the corporate 
finance literature. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) analyze the implications of the agency problem between a 
firm’s shareholders (principal) and the management (agent) and between shareholders 
and bondholders in an informationally efficient capital market. The agency problem 
arises in part because of the imperfect observability of managerial effort and costly 
contracting. Hence, the manager (agent), who should serve the interest of the 
shareholders (principal), tries, instead, to maximize his personal wealth. This 
information opacity affects the economic operators’ ability to assess appropriate risk 
levels according to their risk appetite.  
In particular, the information opacity of credit intermediaries is often caused by both 
managerial opportunism phenomena and by excessive cost of disclosure. The 
predominant literature, indeed, claims that there are many advantages of a good 
disclosure that results in reduction of the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991), easy access to found (Linsey and Schrives, 2005), creation of more stability in 
the whole banking industry and consequent reduction of systemic risk (Nier and 
Baumann, 2006), and effective tool for avoiding banking crises (Financial Stability 
Board, 2012). However, other Athors argue that there are some disadvantages related to 
the excessive disclosure due to the complexity of banks’ business because markets are 
unable to incorporate additional information in a beneficial way (Hodder et al., 2001; 
Hassan et al., 2009; Hassan and Mohd-Saleh, 2010; Siregar et al. 2013). In addition, 
banks often oppose to requirements asking for higher disclosures because they 
determine significant costs (Mozes, 2002, Gebhardt, 2004). 
Nowadays, the increase globalization of financial markets has claimed for more 
standardization of accounting practices at international level. Moreover, the significant 
increase in international investments has necessitated the need for more reliable and 
informative financial statements on a global basis (Anandajaran et al., 2010). Indeed, 
disclosure is a tool of overcoming the limits of the financial reporting. Financial 
operators use to say “Selling equity is selling story”, i.e. to sell the security necessary to 
sell the story relating to the company and its competitive environment. However, due to 
imperfections, or externalities, of financial market, investors are not able to assess 
entities’ value and consequently to evaluate appropriate investments. Information 
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problem arises from information differences, so disclosure is critical for the functioning 
of an efficient capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
The importance of risk disclosures as a tool of helping users to understand the risks 
associated with on - and off - balance sheet items has been accentuated in the last years 
(Maffei et al., 2014). The consequences of limited transparency regarding financial 
instruments risk exposure have highlighted the opacity of annual reports, leading to the 
mispricing of risk and misallocation of capital, and affecting investors ability to assess 
their investment decision. 
Hence, the usefulness of financial instruments risk disclosure is an important tool of 
helping users to understand the risks associated with on - and off – balance is an evident 
question for the scientific community, indeed the consequences of the lack of 
transparency related to financial instruments, already to their complex nature, are now 
known. 
The banking sector is particularly concerned in financial instruments risk disclosure 
issue, especially during the last financial crisis (Woods et al., 2008; Gebardht et al., 
2014). Indeed, banks’ financial reports assumes a dual function: it must guide the 
choices of financial operators; it is subject to control by the supervisory bodies, in order 
to ensure the proper functioning of markets (Maffei, 2010). To prosecute these aims it is 
necessary that the banks financial reporting deal with in a broad and comprehensive 
way the risks associated with its brokerage business, which is increasingly addressing to 
financial instruments (Ruozi, 2015).  
In recent years, policy makers such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) have taken significant 
steps to improve market reporting, with IFRS 7 and the III Pillar of the revised 
Framework for International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards.  
Some scholars (i.e. Bischof, 2009) argue that financial reporting transparency improves 
in European banking sector under IFRS 7 and claim for more studies on the value 
relevance of financial instruments risk disclosure for investors. Now, IFRS 7 is the only 
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principle in force about FIRD, so it is the only accounting policy that has had an impact 
on the financial markets. 
Currently academic empirical research on IFRS 7 mostly concentrated on compliance 
and relevance on selected type of risk disclosure (Maffei, 2009; Amoako and Asante, 
2013; Hossin, 2014; Zango et al., 2015; Papa, 2016). Therefore, this study is different 
from previous ones because it focuses on all types of financial risk information under 
IFRS 7 (credit, market and liquidity risks) in the bank sector of the European market. 
Existing studies on IFRS 7 show mixed evidence. PriceWaterhouse-Coopers (2006, 
2008) found that IFRS 7 does not significantly affect the disclosure of risk management 
activities. Similarly, Linsley et al. (2006) criticize that disclosure provided by IFRS 7 is 
were essentially qualitative.  
Also Maffei (2009) states that the disclosure however is poor when it comes to 
administering information on risks, their impact on the balance sheet accounts and the 
possible ways of managing them. 
Lastly, a study by Papa (2016) shows that, in general, the compliance with IFRS 7 
disclosure requirements by financial statement preparers is inconsistent and incomplete. 
However, Bischof (2009) and Woods et al. (2008) found otherwise: IFRS 7 wa the 
necessary next step to ensure more transparency in financial market, especially wih 
regard to banks. 
Amoako and Asante (2013), and Hossain (2014) focus on compliance of IFRS 7 and 
conclude that banks are good at complying with the standard in the emerging markets of 
Ghana and Bangladesh, respectively.  
More recently, Zango et al. (2015) conduct a study on banks IFRS 7 compliance in 
another emerging country (Nigeria), showing high level of compliance and positively 
relates with risk management committee effectiveness.  
Overall, evidence shows that disclosure is far from perfect, indeed not all banks are 
fully complied with IFRS 7. In this respect, Oliveira et al. (2011) argue that IAS/IFRS 
are not aligned with the way financial companies manage risk, and that they are not 
bank-oriented standards 
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The problem is that IAS/IFRS focus only on financial risk, ignoring other kinds of risks 
(such as operational risks) faced by banks. This misalignment can culminate in the 
dispersal of risk reporting practices throughout an annual report, rendering them 
incomparable, and imprecise (Woods and Marginson, 2004; Woods et al., 2008). 
Hence, the contribution of this thesis to the literature review consists in an improvement 
of value relevance of IFRS 7 in the European banking system. Indeed, this topic, on the 
best of our knowledge, is not fully studied in the value relevance field. 
The relevance has been tested based on the nature of financial risk disclosure. In 
particular, to provide more in depth analysis on IFRS 7, the financial disclosure has 
been divided in qualitative and quantitative financial risk information. The two 
following two hypotheses have been formulated: 
 
H1: The qualitative disclosure required by IFRS 7 is associated with European banks’ 
share price. 
 
H2: The quantitative disclosure required by IFRS 7 is associated with European banks’ 
share price. 
 
With this regard, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) argue that the different nature of 
disclosure is crucial to any analysis as the market responds differently. Indeed, they 
conclude that that greater total disclosure is not associated with a lower cost of equity 
capital. However, they find that limiting the analysis to an examination of the 
association between overall disclosure level and the cost of equity capital is insufficient, 
as the relation between disclosure level and cost of equity capital varies by type of 
disclosure. Moreover, they find that examining the association between one type of 
disclosure (i.e. quantitative) without controlling for other types of disclosure (i.e. 
qualitative) may lead to spurious associations resulting in erroneous conclusions. 
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Chapter 3: An empirical investigation on IFRS 7 in the European 
banking sector 
3.1 The research design 
3.1.1 The sample 
To provide results, similar to Devalle et al. (2010), I observe the annual reports of 
European banks listed in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Madrid and Milan Stock Exchanges 
over a 8-year period, 2007– 2014. I focus on this setting because it represents the 
financial markets with the highest capitalization in Europe (source: Thomson Reuters). 
The following table 6 shows European stock market capitalization.  
 
Table 6. European Stock Exchange capitalization (%) 
Countries Capitalization (n) Capitalization (%) 
Belgium 24,364,482,687.49 0.06 
Cyprus 12,489,072.06 0.00 
Denmark 214,727,608,295.86 0.51 
France 8,000,269,024,007.25 18.97 
Germany 7,634,503,828,656.46 18.10 
Italy 5,498,358,842,283.71 13.03 
Republic of Ireland 325,004,506.77 0.00 
Luxemburg 178,162,381,049.94 0.42 
Netherland 3,556,166,576,197.67 8.43 
Norway 1,468,681,547,387.96 3.48 
Poland 633,177.24 0.00 
Portugal 5,706,940,412.86 0.01 
Spain 7,188,405,232,966.56 17.04 
Sweden 27,210,256,519.29 0.06 
Switzerland 214,413,960,483.07 0.51 
United Kingdom  8,170,994,886,748.57 19.37 
 
The total sample selection procedure starts with 86 listed banks (source: Thomson 
Reuters). The sample selection procedure at different steps is provided in table 7. It can 
68 
  
 
noted that only UK presents missing financial data. The final sample consists of 536 
observations over a 8-year period 2007– 2014.  
 
Table 7. Sample composition 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Tot 
UK 9 12 12 12 12 14 14 14 99 
 
Missing financial 
data 
1 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 37 
France 20 20 20 20 20 20 21 19 160 
Germany 11 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 100 
Spain 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 60 
Italy 20 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 164 
Tot 66 66 66 67 68 70 72 71 546 
 
3.1.2 The financial disclosure index 
The financial disclosure index is based on qualitative and quantitative type of 
information on credit, market (i.e. price risk, interest risk and exchange risk) and 
liquidity risk as requested under IFRS 7 (paragraphs 7:36-7:37-7:38-7:39-7:40).  
Types of risk item to be disclosed are provided below: 
1. Qualitative information for credit risk 
a. the exposures to risks and how they arise 
b. its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and the methods 
used to measure the risk 
c. any changes in (a) or (b) from the previous period 
2. Quantitative information for credit risk 
a. the amount that best represents its maximum exposure to credit risk at the 
end of the reporting period without considering any collateral held or other 
credit enhancements; 
b. description of collateral held as security and other credit enhancements, and 
their financial effect in respect of the amount that best represents the 
maximum exposure to credit risk  
c. information about the credit quality of financial assets that are neither past 
due nor impaired 
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d. an analysis of the age of financial assets that are past due as at the end of the 
reporting period but not impaired 
e. an analysis of financial assets that are individually determined to be impaired 
as at the end of the reporting period 
f. the nature and carrying amount of the assets 
g. policies for disposing or for using assets in its operations when they are not 
readily convertible into cash 
3. Qualitative information for market risk 
a. the exposures to risks and how they arise 
b. its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and the methods 
used to measure the risk 
c. any changes in (a) or (b) from the previous period 
4. Quantitative information for market risk 
a. sensitivity analysis for each type of market risk to which the entity is 
exposed  
b. methods and assumptions used in preparing the sensitivity analysis 
c. changes from the previous period in the methods and assumptions used, and 
the reasons for such changes 
d. an explanation of the method used in preparing such a sensitivity analysis, 
and of the main parameters and assumptions underlying the data provided 
e. an explanation of the objective of the method used and of limitations that 
may result in the information not fully reflecting the fair value of the assets 
and liabilities involved 
f. facts and the reasons to believe the sensitivity analyses are unrepresentative 
5. Qualitative information for liquidity risk 
a. the exposures to risks and how they arise 
b. its objectives, policies and processes for managing the risk and the methods 
used to measure the risk 
c. any changes in (a) or (b) from the previous period 
6. Quantitative information for liquidity risk 
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a. a maturity analysis for non-derivative financial liabilities (including issued 
financial guarantee contracts) that shows the remaining contractual 
maturities 
b. a maturity analysis for derivative financial liabilities 
c. a description of how it manages the liquidity risk inherent in (a) and (b) 
Manual content analysis is used to obtain the details of the index from banks annual 
accounts. An important issue is the reliability of this research instrument, which 
concerns the accuracy in measuring the concepts under investigation. To address such 
issue, each annual report has been scored by two young reserchers, under the 
supervision of three senior researchers. In case of uncertainty about specific scoring, a 
careful consultation among the researchers was made to reach a final agreed score. This 
is consistent with previous IFRS disclosure studies (Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and 
Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003). 
To analyze the collected data, a Total Financial Disclosure Index (TFDI) was defined 
following Cook’ (1992) and Hossain and Reaz’ (2007) studies. This index is defined by 
dividing the total number of required disclosures provided by a bank as follows: 
 
TFDIij = 
∑𝑥𝑖
𝑛
 
where 
xij = 1 if i item is disclosed by firm j 0 otherwise 
n = number of items included in the disclosure index. 
 
Similarly, we have developed the qualitative financial disclosure index (QLFDI) and the 
quantitative financial disclosure index (QTFDI). 
 
QLFDIij = 
∑𝑥𝑖
𝑛
 
 
QTFDIij = 
∑𝑥𝑖
𝑛
 
 
Hence the indexes explains the total number of items disclosed by the bank j divided by 
the total number items of the checklist, so that: 
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0 ≤ TFDI ≥ 1 (the maximum score is represented by 24 items); 
0 ≤ QLFDI ≥ 1 (the maximum score is represented by 9 items); 
0 ≤ QTFDI ≥ 1 (the maximum score is represented by 15 items); 
 
The items forming the index are not weighted in order to provide equal prominence to 
both each section of the standard and any user-groups of the financial reports (Wallace 
and Naser, 1995; Giner, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2005). 
Furthermore, several prior studies have argued that the result of the equal weighting 
procedure tend to be similar to those of other weighting systems (Zarzeski, 1996; 
Prencipe, 2004; Amoako and Asante, 2013). 
3.1.3 Econometric model and variables 
According to many studies on value relevance (Ventel et al., 2014; Barth et al., 2014; 
Clacher et al., 2013), I adopt the price (P) as a proxy for banks’ value.  
I chosen the share price as the dependent variable because it is more suitable for studies 
that want to investigate if the information involved in accounting amounts affects 
investors’ choices Many studies about the value relevance examine the association 
between accounting information and share prices (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; 
Nelson, 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Ventel et al., 2014; Barth et al., 2014). 
The qualitative (QLFDI) and quantitative (QTFDI) financial disclosure indexes are used 
as main test variables, then also some other independent variables are added as 
explained later.  
The statistical software Stata runs four different equations in order to verify changing in 
value relevance levels through the use of R
2
 (Brown et al., 1999; Beisland 2009).  
Firstly, model [a] has performed using the historical variable of value relevance 
literature according to the banking structure. 
Usually, value relevance studies use earnings or EPS, and book value of equity or 
BVPS as basic variables to test the relevance of information (Barth et al., 2001; 
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Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Beisland, 2009). In this work core tier 1 is added in order 
to substitute the BVPS because this variable is more suitable for the banking sector. 
Core tier 1 is the ratio between tier 1 capital and risk weighted assets. This is the 
measure of a bank's financial strength based on the sum of its equity capital and 
disclosed reserves, and sometimes non-redeemable, non-cumulative preferred stock. A 
bank’s risk-weighted assets include all assets that the firm holds that are systematically 
weighted for credit risk. Tier 1 capital for a banking firm includes the value of its 
common stock, retained earnings, accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI), 
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and any adjustments to those accounts. The 
amount of tier 1 capital a bank holds and its proportion to its risk-weighted assets are 
important. In times of financial distress or recession, tier 1 capital is the first to absorb 
losses before other investors, such as debt holders, experience losses. The tier 1 capital 
ratio signifies how well a bank can withstand financial distress before it becomes 
insolvent. 
Regulators use the tier 1 capital ratio to grade a bank’s capital adequacy as well-
capitalized, adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized or 
critically undercapitalized. To be classified as well-capitalized, a bank must have a tier 
1 capital ratio of 6% or greater under Basel III requirements and must not pay any 
dividends or distributions that would affect its capital.  
In addition, I add also a variable that capture banks volatility because recent research 
has analysed the role played by financial reporting in the economic downturn (Whalen, 
2008; Katz, 2008; Kothari and Lester, 2012). The increased uncertainty about 
fundamental values typically translates into greater volatility in the market prices of the 
assets by causing investors to react more strongly to new information. 
 
P= α+ β1CORE_TIER1jt+β2EPSjt+β3Bank_volatilityjt +ε    (a) 
 
where: 
a. Price (P) is the stock price 4 months after the ending reporting year. According to 
value relevance literature, it indicates banks’ value. 
73 
  
 
b. Core Tier 1 (CORE_TIER1). The ratio is calculated as Tier 1 on risk weighted 
assets, which measures banks’ reliability as a powerful tool for understanding their 
value. The Tier 1 capital of the bank is similar to the book value of equity of an 
industrial firm. It is composed by: common share, retained earnings, other 
comprehensive income and common share capital issued by subsidiaries and held by 
third parties (Basel Committee, 2012). This is an indicator of risk hedging by equity. 
This ratio suggests bank’s capacity to hedge the event of financial and operational risks 
without using external resources. Disclosure is related to the role of equity (in our study, 
the Core Tier 1), due to the information of shareholders need and the monitoring costs 
(Caldarelli et al., 2012).  
c. EPS is Earnings per share, and represents the portion of an entity’s profit allocated 
to each outstanding share of common stock. Earnings per share serves as an indicator of 
an entity’s profitability (Ventel et al., 2014; Baboukardos and Rimmel, 2014; Mechelli, 
2013). 
d. Bank volatility is a statistical measure of the dispersion of returns for a given 
security. Given that the considered period (2007-2014) is particularly uncertain due to 
economic crisis, we add this variable because uncertainty translates into greater 
volatility in the financial market by causing investors to react more strongly to 
information (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
In model [b] other variables of banking activity are included. First of all, a liquidity 
index is added to control for economic crisis because, as stated by Allen and Carletti 
(2008), the crucial features of the crisis are related to liquidity provision. These crucial 
features of the crisis are the significant fall in prices of many AAA-rated tranches of 
securitized products including many unrelated to subprime mortgages, the drying up of 
interbank markets for maturities beyond a few days and the change in haircuts on 
collateralized lending, the fear of contagion. The authors suggest that the significant 
discounts on AAA-rated tranches of securitized products that are too large to be 
explained by the underlying fundamentals are the result of cash-in-the-market pricing. 
These price movements were unanticipated and have produced a whole set of problems 
for risk management going forward. The drying up of liquidity in interbank markets is 
usually attributed to a mixture of liquidity hoarding by banks to counter the increased 
uncertainty over aggregate liquidity demand and fear of lending to other banks. At the 
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end of 2007 the evidence seems to be that banks were to a large extent hoarding 
liquidity rather than refusing to lend to too counterparts because credit default swaps on 
banks were only elevated somewhat. 
The Return On Equity (ROE) in an important measure of bank’s profitability by 
revealing how much profit a bank generates with the money shareholders have invested. 
The higher the index, the more the bank is perceived as safe. 
Cash flow per share signals a company's ability to pay debt, pay dividends, buy back 
stock and facilitate the growth of business. Also, the free cash flow per share can be 
used to give a preliminary prediction concerning future share prices. For example, when 
a firm's share price is low and free cash flow is on the rise, the odds are good that 
earnings and share value will soon be on the up, because a high cash flow per share 
value means that earnings per share should potentially be high as well. 
Based on the traditional role of bank, we can note that loans make up the bulk of banks' 
assets (Njanike, 2009), non performing loans (NPL) has attracted a great deal of interest 
among researchers and policy makers during the last four decades as these increasing 
non-performing loans are causing banking crisis which are turning into banking failures 
(Rajha, 2016). Moreover, the non-performing loans were considered one of the main 
causes of the global financial crisis (2007-2009) which damaged the USA economy and 
economies of many countries. (Rajha, 2016). Hence I add a variable to capture NPL 
since it is known that they are relevant in the considered period (EBA, 2015). 
Finally, the leverage ratio is the relationship between a banking organization's core 
capital and its total assets. Leverage ratio is calculated by dividing Tier 1 capital by a 
bank's average total consolidated assets and certain off-balance sheet exposures. 
Similarly to the Tier 1 capital ratio, the Tier 1 leverage ratio is used as a tool by central 
monetary authorities to ensure the capital adequacy of banks and to place constraints on 
the degree to which a financial company can leverage its capital base. The minimum 
requirement established by Basel III is 3%. 
Hence, model [b] is the follow: 
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P=α+β1CORE_TIER1jt+β2EPSjt+β3Bank_volatilityjt+β4LIQjt+β5ROEjt+β6CFPSjt+β7NP
Ljt+β8LEVjt +ε                (b) 
 
Where: 
a. Liquidity index (LIQ), which tests the ability of the bank to meet short-term 
commitments. Consistent with the Basel Committee, our measure for liquidity is cash 
and financial assets available for trading on deposits. A high liquidity ratio is an 
indicator of good performance (Al-Akra and Ali, 2012). Accordingly, banks with higher 
liquidity ratios are expected to have higher firm value.  
b. Return On Equity (ROE) is the ratio between earnings and book value of equity. 
Some studies (e.g. Azzali et al., 2012) have demonstrated that financial market is 
particularly sensitive to this measure because it indicates a corporation's profitability by 
revealing how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have 
invested. 
c. Cash Flow per Share (CFPS) is a financial ratio that measures the operating cash 
flows attributable to each share of common stock. Many financial analysts place more 
emphasis on the cash-flow-per-share value than on earnings-per-share values. While an 
earnings-per-share value can be easily manipulated, cash flow per share is more difficult 
to alter, resulting in what may be a more accurate value of the strength and 
sustainability of a particular business model. 
d. Non performing loans (NPL) is the ratio between the amount of NPL and total 
loans. This measurement is particularly significant in the period analyzed, indeed the 
EBA has stated that although the indicator has improved in the last year, it has always 
been high enough for European banks. 
e. Leverage (LEV) calculated as Tier 1 on total assets on and off balance sheet. This 
indicator stems arbitrage regulations and captures the bank’s total assets (on and off 
balance sheet). It has crucial importance for banks, in particular after the last financial 
crisis (Basel Commettee, 2014). It indicates how many assets are funding by equity. A 
high level of leverage ratio suggests a wide shareholders’ responsibility with respect to 
bank investments. 
f. Log of total assets (logASSETS) is the proxy of size to mitigate the scale effect 
(Brown et al., 1999;  Barth et al., 2001). In addition, some studies have demonstrated 
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that bigger banks have more relevant accounting numbers than smaller ones (Agostino 
et al., 2011); 
 
Models [c] and [d] includes the Qualitative (QLFDI) and Quantitative (QTFDI) 
financial disclosure indexes.  
 
P=α+β1CORE_TIER1jt+β2EPSjt+β3Bank_volatilityjt+β4LIQjt+β5ROEjt+β6CFPSjt+β7NP
Ljt+β8LEVjt+ β9QLFDIjt +ε             (c) 
 
P=α+β1CORE_TIER1jt+β2EPSjt+β3Bank_volatilityjt+β4LIQjt+β5ROEjt+β6CFPSjt+β7NP
Ljt+β8LEVjt+ β9QTFDIjt +ε             (d) 
 
Consistent with past studies (Al-Akra and Ali, 2012; Clacher et al., 2013; Ventel et al., 
2014; Barth et al., 2014), we test the research hypothesis with a panel data analysis. 
The following table shows the variables etiquette and how I calculate them. 
 
Table 8. Variables description and measurement 
Variable name Label Name Measure Description 
Price P 
Stock price 4 months 
after the ending 
reporting year 
Banks’ value 
Core tier 1 CORE_TIER 1 Tier 1 on RWA 
Banks’ capacity to 
hedge the event of 
financial and 
operational risks 
without using 
external resources 
Earnings per share EPS 
Earnings on common 
share 
Banks’ profitability 
Bank volatility Bank_volatility 
Standard deviation 
between returns from 
that same security 
Dispersion of returns 
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Liquidity index LIQ 
Cash and equivalents 
plus available fro sale 
on total deposits 
Banks’ ability to meet 
short-term 
commitments. 
Return on Equity ROE 
Earnings on book 
value of equity 
Banks’ profitability 
with the money 
shareholders have 
invested. 
Cash flow per share CFPS 
Free cash flow on 
common shares 
Strength and 
sustainability of 
banks’ business 
model 
Non performing loans NPL NPL on total loans Exposure at risk 
Leverage ratio LEV 
Tier 1 on total assets 
on and off balance 
Shareholders’ 
responsibility with 
respect to bank 
investments. 
Qualitative financial 
disclosure index 
QLFDI 
Sum of qualitative 
items required by 
IFRS 7 on total items 
Relevance of 
qualitative FIRD 
Quantitative financial 
disclosure index 
QTFDI 
Sum of quantitative 
items required by 
IFRS 7 on total items 
Relevance of 
quantitative FIRD 
Book value per share BVPS 
Book value of equity 
on common shares 
Similar to core tier 1, 
I use this variable as 
robustness test 
Source: Own elaboration 
3.2 Results 
3.2.1 Tests on Financial Disclosure Indexes 
Some tests on the Financial Disclosure Index (FDI) are performed, splitted in qualitative 
and quantitative indexes in order to observe which of its types of information has most 
influenced the total index. 
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Table 9 shows the European mean of FDI for each year highlighting an increase of 
almost 12% in IFRS 7 compliance from 2007 to 2014. As Bischof (2009), the t statistic 
has performed in the last column in order to compare statistically significant differences 
in means between the FDI in 2007 and the FDI in 2014. It can be observed that this 
difference is statistically significant at a 1% level both for qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure. 
The qualitative information shows a higher level of compliance with IFRS 7 than 
quantitative one. It has a score of 0.68 in 2007 and it slightly increases in subsequent 
years. Overall, it displays an increase of 14.70%. 
The quantitative index is 0.64 in 2007 and reaches 0.74 in 2014 (+15.62%). 
The total FDI increases of 11.52% from 2007 to 2014. Also in this case there is 
statistically significant difference at a 0.1%.  
 
Table 9. Univariate analysis of the effects of IFRS 7 adoption on disclosure 
European mean Statistic (t)  
    
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2007-2014 
Qualitative FDI  0.68 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78 -4.69*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.74 0.74 -5.03*** 
TOT FDI 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 -5.81*** 
 
Table 10 points out the FDI mean for each year by Country divided in qualitative and 
quantitative indexes.  
UK shows a similar trend in the observed period (almost 80%). In 2008 the compliance 
mean to IFRS 7 slightly decrease (-2%), maybe because with the advent of the crisis in 
2007, banks were more reluctant of giving information for fear of damaging their 
profitability (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998). Generally, there are not statistically 
significant differences in means between the FDI in 2007 and the FDI in 2013 because 
UK is a common law Country, therefore it was generally less affected by the transition 
to international accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1997; Ball et al., 2000). Looking 
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at the differences between qualitative and quantitative disclosure, it can observe that 
qualitative information shows a 5% level of significance, even though English banks 
seems to be more compliant with regard quantitative information (81% in 2007 respect 
73% of qualitative). In the observed period, qualitative information increases of 6.85%, 
while quantitative raises of 3.70%. This could explain the absence of significance t 
statistic for quantitative disclosure. 
Unlike UK, the other Countries under investigation show statistically significant means 
differences in FDI in 2007 and 2014 being civil law ones. 
Germany already has a high score in 2007 (0.73). It suffers only a sliglthly decrease in 
2008 (-1.4%), but it recovers in 2009 (+3%). In 2010 the German FDI stabilizes at 0.81. 
Both qualitative and quantitative disclosure are statistically significant at 1% level. 
Table 10. Univariate analysis of the effects of IFRS 7 adoption on disclosure by 
Country 
European FDI mean Statistic (t) 2007-
2014  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
UK 
Qualitative 
FDI 
0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 -2.43** 
Quantitative 
FDI 
0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 -2.17 
Tot FDI 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 -1.06 
Germany 
Qualitative 
FDI 
0.79 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.93 -2.36*** 
Quantitative 
FDI 
0.67 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 -2.76*** 
Tot FDI 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 -4.71*** 
Spain 
Qualitative 
FDI 
0.66 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.79 -2.23** 
Quantitative 
FDI 
0.42 0.49 0.52 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.64 -2.81*** 
Tot FDI 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.70 -3.33*** 
Italy 
Qualitative 
FDI 
0.39 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50 -2.39** 
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Quantitative 
FDI 
0.64 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 -1.63 
Tot FDI 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61 -3.22*** 
France 
Qualitative 
FDI 
0.99 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.00 
Quantitative 
FDI 
0.63 0.63 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.79 -2.37** 
Tot FDI 0.81 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 -4.05*** 
 
Spain and Italy recorded the lowest FDI score in 2007 (0.54 and 0.55 respectively), but 
the former in more compliant than the latter (0.70 and 0.61 respectively in 2013). 
Finally, Spain rises of IFRS 7 information recording an increasing of almost 30% from 
2007 to the end of the observed period, while Italy of almost 11%. Qualitative and 
quantitative Spanish information have statistically significant differences (5% and 1% 
respectively). 
Italy shows statistically significant differences only for qualitative information at 5%. 
Regarding quantitative disclosure, it is stablish in the observed period. This can explain 
the absence of t statistic signifance. 
France has the highest FDI in the analyzed sample (0.89 in 2014) showing the better 
compliance with IFRS 7. This high score is for the majority affected by qualitative 
information reaching the 89% in 2014. French banks are more compliant to qualitative 
information showing scores of 0.99 in 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012 and 2013. This type of 
information has not statistically significant differences from 2007 to 2013. Instead, 
quantitative disclosure is lower than qualitative displaying a maximum score of 0.79 in 
2014. In this case, it can see statistically significant differences at 5% level. 
In table 11 has shown an univariate analysis as above distinguishing for each financial 
risk (i.e. credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk).  
European Countries are more compliant about liquidity risk recording a higher score 
than credit and market ones in the all observed period. Indeed, in 2007 liquidity risk has 
already a score of 0.70 with respect credit risk (0.67) and market risk (0.60). 
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Table 11. Univariate analysis of the effects of IFRS 7 (splitted in financial risks) 
adoption on disclosure 
 
All financial risks increase with a very similar trend. In 2014, credit risk information 
has increased of almost 13% with respect the first year of IFRS 7 application; market 
risk information has increased of 15% and liquidity risk information has raised of 14%.  
The parametric test indicates that there is a statistically significant means differences in 
FDI for each financial risk in the observed period.  
Observing qualitative and quantitative information for each risk, it can see that banks 
are more compliant to the former than the letter. There are statistically significant 
differences, except quantitative disclosure on market and liquidity risks. 
Similarly, table 12 points out the relevance of each financial risk information by 
Country. 
UK seems to give less importance to market risk disclosure (the trend varies from 0.61 
in 2007 and 0.66 in 2014). Indeed, market risk disclosure requested by IFRS 7 is more 
detailed in particular on sensitivity analysis, so more reluctance to disclose this type of  
information appears. This UK banks’ behavior is connected to the large amount of toxic 
assets in their portfolio (Dell’Atti and Miglietta, 2014).  
European FDI mean 
Statistic (t)  
2007-2014 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Qualitative credit FDI 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 -3.13*** 
Quantitative credit FDI 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 -1.74** 
Credit risk FDI tot 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.76 -4.30*** 
Qualitative market FDI 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.77 -3.07*** 
Quantitative market FDI 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 -0.79 
Market risk FDI tot 0.60 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 -6.07*** 
Qualitative liquidity FDI 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 -3.26*** 
Quantitative liquidity FDI 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 -0.34 
Liquidity risk FDI tot 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.80 -4.57*** 
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Overall, only liquidity risk disclosure appears statistically significant in means, maybe 
becouse a big English bank (Northern Rock)  was nationalized with a very expensive 
intervention by the Bank of England because it was experiencing serious liquidity 
problems (ECB, 2011). 
Focusing on the qualitative and quantitative indexes, it has highlighted that only 
quantitative disclosure on market risk and qualitative disclosure on liquidity risk show a 
slight statistically significant difference (both at 1% level). 
German FDI shows a slight decline in 2008 for all financial risks (-1.4% for credit risk 
and -1.2% for liquidity risk). The credit risk index is stable from 2011 (0.79), the market 
risk and liquidity indexes from 2012 (0.77 and 0.87 respectively). Statistically 
significant means differences regard credit risk and market risk disclosure because 
recent study have demonstrated that German banks are particularly exposed to this type 
of risks (Upper and Worm, 2004). This has probably led German banks to give more 
emphasis to credit and market risks disclosure. 
Quantitative information on market risk does not present statistically significant 
differences. Instead, liquidity risk shows significance only for qualitative disclosure. 
In 2007, Spain is more focused on market risk disclosure (0.55 vs 0.50 for credit and 
0.40 for liquidity risks). In 2013 disclosure on financial risks has significantly 
increased: +50% disclosure on credit risk; +29% disclosure on market risk; +85% 
disclosure on liquidity risk. The double-digit increase in the disclosure required by IFRS 
7 highlights the efforts of Spain to be as compliant to the standard. For this reason, thare 
are statistically significant in means for all three financial risks. 
Spain shows significant differences for the financial risks at 1%. Looking at qualitative 
and quantitative disclosure, only qualitative information both for market and liquidity 
risks is is not significant.  
Analyzin Italian sample, we can observe that market and liquidity risks disclosure have 
the best score in 2007 (0.54), while credit risk disclosure reachs 0.48. Italian banks 
record an increase by 2013 for both credit risk disclosure (+12.50%) and market risk 
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disclosure (+14.80%) and liquidity risk disclosure (+16.67%). Also in this case, all three 
financial risks are statistically significant in means.  
France is the most compliant of all civil law Countries. It has recorded an increase of 
10.84% in credit risk disclosure, 8.10% in market risk disclosure, 10.59% in liquidity 
risk disclosure. It can see that Student t is statistically significant in means in credit and 
market risks total indexes. Liquidity risk results not significant in mean becouse it 
seems that French banks have always been very conscious about liquidity risk as 
evidenced by the collected data. Also qualitative credit and market risks disclosure 
indexes are not statistically significant in means.  
Table 12. Univariate analysis of the effects of IFRS 7 adoption on disclosure for 
each financial risk by Country 
European FDI mean 
Statistic (t)  
2007-2014 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
UK 
Credit risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 -0.37 
Quantitative FDI 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 -0.41 
Tot FDI 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 -0.61 
Market risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74 -1.00 
Quantitative FDI 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.63 0.63 -1.77* 
Tot FDI 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 -1.60 
Liquidity risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.76 -1.86* 
Quantitative FDI 0.96 0.96 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -1.46 
Tot FDI 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 -2.61*** 
GERMANY 
Credit risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 6.24*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.68 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 2.14** 
Tot FDI 0.70 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 -3.89*** 
Market risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.94 6.06*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.66 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.66 -0.77 
Tot FDI 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.77 -4.38*** 
 
Liquidity risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 8.40*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.32 
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Tot FDI 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 -0.76 
SPAIN 
Credit risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.58 0.67 0.74 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.85 0.85 -2.94*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.65 -3.09*** 
Tot FDI 0.50 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.70 0.75 0.75 -3.65*** 
Market risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.58 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.74 -1.76 
Quantitative FDI 0.53 0.56 0.52 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.69 -3.33*** 
Tot FDI 0.55 0.63 0.61 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.71 -4.95*** 
Liquidity risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.62 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.78 -1.76 
Quantitative FDI 0.17 0.37 0.52 0.59 0.67 0.70 0.70 0.70 -3.12*** 
Tot FDI 0.40 0.52 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.74 -3.94*** 
ITALY 
Credit risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.43 0.52 0.45 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.54 0.54 -2.65*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.00 
Tot FDI 0.48 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.54 -2.68** 
Market risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.56 -2.45*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.67 -1.00 
Tot FDI 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.62 -2.80*** 
Liquidity risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.34 0.34 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 -2.25*** 
Quantitative FDI 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.83 -1.74 
Tot FDI 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.63 -2.78*** 
FRANCE 
Credit risk 
Qualitative FDI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Quantitative FDI 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.84 -2.55** 
Tot FDI 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.92 -2.75** 
Market risk 
Qualitative FDI 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.00 
Quantitative FDI 0.53 0.53 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 -1.93* 
Tot FDI 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 -1.96* 
Liquidity risk 
Qualitative FDI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Quantitative FDI 0.71 0.71 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 -1.32 
Tot FDI 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 -1.33 
3.2.2 Descriptive statistic 
Table 13 shows descriptive statistics of banks for the dependent and independent 
variables. 
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Table 13. Descriptive statistics 
 Min Max Mean St.Dev 
Price 0 93.00 22.52 22.68 
EPS 0 0.92 0.60 11.26 
Core Tier 1 0.02 0.56 0.13 0.14 
Bank volatility 0 181.00 25.32 13.74 
Liq. Index 0 3.00 0.10 0.21 
ROE -0.43 0.47 0.05 0.10 
CFPS -0.47 0.46 0.13 8.69 
NPL 0.01 0.74 0.20 0.20 
Leverage 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.03 
QLFDI 0.22 1 0.69 0.22 
QTFDI 0.13 0.87 0.62 0.15 
 
The dependent variable (Price) fluctuates from a minimum of 0.04 to a maximum of 
93.00 because the sample includes both very big European banks and small ones. For 
this reason, also the variability, measured by the standard deviation, is quite high 
(22.68). The mean price is 22.52.  
The qualitative financial disclosure index has a maximum of 1 showing a full 
compliance to qualitative information and a mean of 0.69. Instead, the quantitative 
financial disclosure index has a maximum of 0.87 and a mean of 0.62, slightly lower 
than the qualitative information. 
EPS has a mean of 0.60 indicating a quite good banks profitability, but the standard 
deviation shows that the sample is not homogeneous. 
Core Tier 1 as proxy for high quality capital ratio has a mean of 0.13, but a minimum 
and a maximum of 0.02 and 0.56, respectively, due to the presence of very different 
portions of risk weighted assets. 
The maximum of bank volatility is very high indicating that the period is affected by 
hard financial turmoil. 
The Liquidity Index shows a low mean (0.10) indicating that the European banks 
investigated could not be able to meet short-term commitments, despite the maximum is 
3.00. 
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The minimum ROE is negative because of the large losses suffered by the European 
banking sector during the period under investigation, while the mean is 0.05. 
CFPS shows a minimum of -0.47 and a maximum of 0.46. The mean is 0.13 showing a 
limited funding ability. 
The maximum amount of NPL is very high (0.74) showing that the financial reporting 
of European banks are rather burdened by the amount of non-performing loans, but 
fortunately the average is lower 
The trend of Leverage is peculiar since it is very low (0.01) due to the off balance sheet 
items, below the minimum requirements set by Basel III Accord (3%) for small banks, 
but it has reached a maximum of 0.11. The mean is 0.04, so the majority of observed 
banks are slightly above the aforementioned limit. 
This further innovation of Basel III is the introduction of a limit on the use of leverage 
by banks. In fact, during the crisis, it became clear that during the euphoria of the 
economic cycle, many banks that met the capital requirements have actually developed 
a very low leverage, especially through the massive increasing of off-balance sheet 
activities. Once again, the data are few scattered around their mean, so the variability is 
low (0.03).  
Table 14 shows the Pearson correlation between variables. The effects of these variables 
on the dependent one should not be considered as a whole, but individually.  
Table 14. Pearson correlation 
 Price EPS 
Core 
Tier 1 
Bank 
volatility 
Liq 
index 
ROE CFPS NPL Leverage QLFDI QTFDI 
Price 1           
EPS 0.41*** 1          
Core Tier 
1 
0.02 0.03 1         
Bank 
volatility 
0.05 -0.05 0.04 1        
Liq index 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.38*** 1       
ROE 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.06 -0.21*** 0.12*** 1      
CFPS 0.38*** 0.20*** 0.05 -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.10** 1     
NPL -0.05 0.06 -0.12** -0.02 -0.10** 0.02 -0.07* 1    
Leverage -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.07* 1   
QLFDI 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.00 -0.07 0.08** 0.35*** -0.08** 0.01 1  
QTFDI 0.11* -0.03 0.06 0.13** -0.09** -0.10** 0.05 0.12*** -0.02 0.41*** 1 
87 
  
 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level 
 
At first glance, it can see that multicollinearity is not a problem, but in the next 
paragraphs will be shown more specific tests (VIF and Tolerance). 
The dependent variable is significantly correlated with EPS, ROE, CFPS and the two 
indexes. 
The QLFDI is significantly and positively correlated with Price, EPS, Core Tier 1, 
ROE, CFPS and QTFDI. It is significantly and negatively correlated with NPL. 
Lastly, the QTFDI is significantly and positively correlated with Price, Bank volatility, 
NPL and QLTD, while it is significantly and negatively correlated with liquidity index 
and ROE. 
3.2.3 Results and discussion 
Before to run the panel data analysis, we have developed the tests to be sure to respect 
the assumptions of the model: 
 normality of dependent variable (Shapiro-Wilk test): 
 homoskedasticity (Breausch-Pagan test); 
 absence of autocorrelation between residuals (Durbin-Watson test); 
 absence of multicollinearity (VIF and Tolerance) (all tests are untabled). 
The aforementioned tests are all statistically significant. 
First of all, we have calculated both fixed effects and random effects to decide which is 
the best solution using the Hausman Test (untabled). The result suggests to develop the 
random effects because, unlike the fixed effects model, the variation across entities is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables 
included in the model. In addition, random effects assume that the entity’s error term is 
not correlated with the predictors which allows for time-invariant variables to play a 
role as explanatory variables. 
Table 15 displays regression results for panel data. 
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Table 15. Panel data analysis 
PANEL Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) Model (e) Model (f) 
(Constant) 16.14(5.49)*** 12.45(3.67)*** 11.25(3.50)*** 12.91(3.50)*** 12.55(3.80)*** 12.91(3.85)*** 
EPS 0.45(3.88)*** 0.41(3.70)*** 0.39(3.50)*** 0.39(3.66)*** 0.37(3.65)*** 0.36(3.96)*** 
Core Tier 1 5.01(3.74)*** 5.08(3.76)*** 6.66(3.71)*** 0.39(5.24)*** - - 
BVPS - - - - 5.56(3.15)*** 3.02(3.24)*** 
Bank 
volatility 
0.15(1.95)** 0.24(2.90)** 0.23(2.80)** 0.26(3.22)*** 0.23(2.81)** 0.26(2.92)*** 
Liq index - -8.64(-1.29) -8.03(-1.20) -2.81(-0.43) -6.03(-1.20) -0.81(-0.43) 
ROE - 37.76(4.37)*** 37.13(4.31)*** 29.50(3.44)*** 35.13(3.89)*** 30.50(2.98)*** 
CFPS - 0.35(3.31)*** 0.34(3.15)*** 0.26(2.45)** 0.34(3.96)*** 0.26(2.89)** 
NPL - 2.78(0.71) 2.13(0.54) 0.87(0.23) 1.13(0.36) 0.63(0.55) 
Leverage - -34.88(-1.27) -38.83(-1.42) -37.73(-1.40) -28.83(-0.42) -27.73(-0.40) 
QLFDI - - 11.56(2.91)** - 10.66(3.91)*** - 
QTFDI - - - 3.89(0.61) - 2.89(0.91) 
Adj R
2 0.15 0.23 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.30 
Wald chi
2 18.04*** 61.97*** 71.45*** 102.20*** 108.96*** 111.63*** 
 
Focusing on the model [a], we observe that Core Tier 1, EPS and Bank volatility are 
statistically significant. The result shows that an increase in Core Tier 1 affects 
positively the banks’ share price (1%  level of significance), since the financial market 
perceives high level of this index as banks’ reliability. Core Tier 1 could be assumed as 
the banks’ book value of equity weighted for risks. Indeed, this result is consistent with 
Agostino et al. (2010) that state that the value relevance of equity book value increases 
for banks that are classified as ‘more transparent banks’. In addition, a recent study by 
the Basel Committee (2015) emphasizes that this index has strengthen financial 
markets’ confidence because it has led to greater transparency by banks, in particular 
after the introduction of Basel III. 
Regarding EPS, literature in general states that they are relevant for investors (Barth et 
al., 2001; Agostino et al., 2010; Clarkson et al., 2011) because they are a good proxy of 
bank profitability. 
Also, bank volatility is positively associated with banks’ value. This results is supported 
by an important principle of finance: the greater risk the higher return. In other words, 
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to invest in more volatile actions is definitely more profitable, but at the same time risky 
because they are long-term investments usually in a turbulent and complex market. 
In the model [b], the R
2
, proxy of value relevance (Brown et al., 1999; Barth et al., 
2001; Beisland, 2009), increases from 0.15 in equation to 0.23. This means that adding 
the aforementioned variables, the straightness of the model is enforced. In this model, 
ROE and CFPS are statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests that financial 
market recognizes positively the ability of the bank capitalization and funding ability. 
Indeed several studies confirm that high capitalization brings confidence among 
investors who perceive the responsibility of shareholders. 
In addition, given that the strong crisis that the market has gone through in the past few 
years, investors reward the entities’ financial capacity represented by CFPS. 
Focusing the attention on NPL (proxy of credit risk), it is not statistically significant. 
This results coulb appear strange because investors usually monitoring credit risk 
because the recent financial crisis has heightened the importance of understand it. 
Despite the fact that IFRS 7 captures certain elements of credit risk disclosure, some 
critics (Butler, 2009) assert that IFRS 7 credit risk disclosures are too basic in that they 
do not faithfully represent the complexity of counterparty and credit risk—which makes 
it even more important to identify the gaps and areas needing improvement in current 
disclosure requirements. A research conucted by CFA (2016) demonstrates that users 
consider disclosures concerning impairment and maximum credit exposure the most 
useful components of credit risk disclosure. In other words, if higher-quality 
information were provided in these disclosures, users would probably assign a higher 
level of importance to them.  
Just as it did for credit risk, the 2007–2009 economic crisis has served to highlight the 
importance of effective management of liquidity risk. IFRS 7 defines liquidity risk as 
the risk that an entity will encounter difficulties in meeting obligations arising from the 
settlement of financial liabilities through the delivery of cash or another financial asset.  
A study conducted by CFA (2016) reveals that users consider the maturity analysis the 
most important component of liquidity risk disclosures. Our results is in contrast with 
this assertion because the liquidity index is not statistically significant in the models. 
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This result could be  justified by a the  European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) that highlights that liquidity disclosures need improvement about levels of 
risk and mitigation strategies would be helpful, particularly for liquidity risk exposures; 
the maturity analysis has several areas in need of improvement, for example maturity 
analysis of off-balance-sheet items (e.g., financial guarantees, backstop facilities) 
should be required; the sensitivity analysis is required for assessing liquidity risk; 
disclosures should highlight the risks associated with liquidity providers, in particular in 
liquidity provider concentration risk and significant covenants that affect liquidity. 
Indeed, it coul be interesting to disclose reported details about the concentration risk of 
liquidity providers should be expanded to inform users about the funding diversity and 
stability of reporting entities’ funding sources. These disclosures should include a 
detailed description of the financing providers, their concentration, and the associated 
counterparty details. 
In the third [c] and fourth [d] models, we add the two financial disclosure indexes 
(QLFDI and QTFDI). Model [c] that includes QLFDI is generally more relevant 
because the R
2
 increases. Only qualitative index has a positive effect on banks’ value, 
meaning that qualitative disclosure recommended by IFRS 7 is value relevant.  
According to Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), qualitative disclosure affects the value of 
bank. From the investors perspective, this finding suggests that qualitative information 
can be easily found because it is supposed to have a clearer language (Pucci and Tutino, 
2012), so it helps investors to better allocate their financial resources and assess the 
bank’s financial position and performance. In addition, qualitative information is quite 
similar from bank to bank and therefore comparison between data from different entities 
is easy for investors. Indeed, it is known that comparability permits users of financial 
statements to understand the differences among firms and may favour investment 
decisions that best fit with users’ risk appetite (Land and Lang, 2002).  A possible 
explanation about the significance of QLFDI could be that comparability increase the 
relevance of this information from investors’ perspectives. Otherwise, quantitative 
disclosure differs from entities because the methodologies of risk management are not 
the same. For example, for the calculation of credit risk, not all banks use the standard 
IRB method; some of them prefer the advanced IRB approach and thus use different 
assumptions for the calculation of parameters. An unskilled investor may believe that 
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thare are not differences between these methods and then he could incorrectly allocate 
his risk appetite.  
Moreover, a study conducted by Cotter et al. (2012) investigates the evaluation of the 
benefits of IFRS adoption by investigating the properties of analyst forecasts around the 
time of adoption and the role of qualitative and quantitative disclosure of IFRS. Results 
show that qualitative disclosure is associated with lower error and lower volatility in 
financial market, suggesting that investors perceive qualitative information as more 
relevant and informative. 
The QTFDI in model [d] is not statistically significant maybe because this type of 
information is difficult to interpret in particular in the banking setting characterized by a 
large amount of complex financial instruments, in particular derivatives that often make 
any interpretation opaque. Consistent with Wagenhofer (2004), a possible explanation is 
that the effects of disclosure depend on three factors: uncertainty, multi-person settings 
with conflicts of interest, and information asymmetry. Depending on the assumptions 
made about these factors, it is possible to predict a negative or absent relationship 
between increased disclosure and entities value. For example, if the production of 
information is costly for an entity, investors perceive the business less profitable.  
Generally speaking, many Authors (i.e. Morgan, 2002; Baumann and Nier, 2004) argue 
that enhancing banks disclosure, in particular financial risk disclosure, leads to higher 
transparency which means more stability in the financial market. Instead, others (i.e. 
Holmstrom, 2015) state that bank regulation and supervision does not publicly reveal 
information about banks’ exposures and relevant economic conditions, because such 
disclosure is information sensitive and it leads to less liquidity. In other words, investors 
remain “sleepy”: they do not have to pay attention to transient fluctuations in the mark-
to market value of bank assets (Hanson et al., 2015). In addition, Acharya and Ryan 
(2016) define banks as “secret keepers” regarding the value of the loans and other assets 
that collateralize their debt claims. Such non-disclosure ensures that investors remain 
symmetrically uninformed about the value of those claims. At this point, the query is: 
banks do not give disclosure because they are only “secret keepers” or because they do 
not know much about relevant economic conditions? This is the case of “symmetric 
ignorance” (Holstrom, 2015). Symmetric ignorance renders banks’ risk management 
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undisciplined, for example, focusing on salient past events rather than on potential 
future events whose occurrence would more significantly impair bank solvency. 
Symmetric ignorance could result in unrelevant information for investors, such as the 
case of our results that suggest a non significant result of the variable QTFDI. Another 
type of bank opacity arises when some investors, possibly banks, have less information 
or learn more slowly than other investors about the value or risk of commonly held 
assets (Acharya and Ryan, 2016). Under this type of opacity, banks’ primary concerns 
are that their assets are less valuable or riskier than current market prices suggest, and 
those prices will fall if other holders of the assets receive adverse information or are 
able to sell on a timelier basis than are the banks. Banks and other investors that receive 
even slightly adverse or ambiguous news about the value or risk of assets may take 
individually protective behaviors, such as racing to the exits to dump the assets, with 
adverse consequences for stability. Banks’ counterparty risk on purchased CDS is an 
example of this type of bank opacity. Banks are not required to and generally do not 
disclose the identities of their counterparties. Also this case could have lead to a non 
significant result of the variable QTFDI.  
Overall, investors sometimes might suspect or misinterpret the intentions of the 
company in providing more information to the market. In summary, the impact of 
disclosure on firm value is still an empirical issue.  
3.2.4 Robustness test  
We have performed a sensitivity test in order to confirm our results. We replace the 
Core Tier 1 (a typical variable of banking sector) with the Book Value of Equity per 
share (BVPS), proxy used in the majority of value relevance studies. 
Many studies have investigated the relation between stock price and book equity 
demonstrating that it is stronger than the association between stock price and earnings 
(Collins et al., 1997; Barth et al., 1998; Dechow et al., 1999). Barth et al. (1998) study 
how value relevance of the balance sheet is related to financial health and find that the 
sensitivity of the equity book value has an indirect relation with the dependent variable, 
proxy of the value of firms’ financial health. Conversely, they find a direct relation with 
earnings. Their conclusion is supported by Dechow et al. (1999), who also find that 
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book values of equity convey additional information over earnings in explaining 
contemporaneous stock prices. For these reasons we have performed other two models. 
 
P=α+β1BVPSjt+β2EPSjt+β3Bank_volatilityjt+β4LIQjt+β5ROEjt+β6CFPSjt+β7NPLjt+β8LE
Vjt+β9QLFDIjt+ε                                                                     (e) 
 
P=α+β1BVPSjt+β2EPSjt+β3Bank_volatilityjt+β4LIQjt+β5ROEjt+β6CFPSjt+β7NPLjt+β8LE
Vjt+β9QTFDIjt+ε               (f) 
 
Table 15 reveals that, even though BVPS is highly significant like Core Tier 1, the R2 
increases of almost 0.04 in model [e] and almost 0.03 in model [f], demonstrating that it 
is more relevant for investors with respect models [c] and [d]. The result is due to the 
opacity of banks’ financial reporting. Indeed, maybe investors prefer to rely on clearer 
and known measures like BVPS. 
Qualitative financial risk disclosure under IFRS 7 is value relevant for banks’ investors, 
helping them to better allocate their financial resources and assess the bank’s financial 
position and performance. 
Conclusions  
This thesis has analyzed the effect on investors of financial instruments risk disclosure 
required by IFRS 7 in the European banking sector before and after the recent financial 
crises that have highlighted the interconnectedness between the state of the economy 
and several key financial risk exposures, such as credit, liquidity, and market risk. 
At the same time, there is often limited transparency for users regarding these risk 
exposures and how they are managed by reporting entities. This limited transparency 
contributes to the mispricing of risk and the misallocation of capital and minimises 
investors’ ability to provide market discipline on a timely basis. It also contributes to 
disorderly capital market corrections in the valuation of companies during crises as 
investors belatedly recognise that reporting entities are riskier than they were assumed 
to be. In order to reply to the main research question “does investors find FIRD 
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provided by banks under IFRS 7 value relevant?”, I perform a panel data analysis using 
a sample composed by 546 observation from 2007 to 2014.  
Results show that only the qualitative disclosure index has a positive effect on banks’ 
value, meaning that qualitative disclosure recommended by IFRS 7 is value relevant. 
According to Alotaibi and Hussainey (2016), qualitative disclosure affects the value of 
bank. From the investors perspective, this finding suggests that qualitative information 
can be easily found because it is supposed to have a clearer language (Pucci and Tutino, 
2012). Qualitative financial risk disclosure under IFRS 7 is value relevant for banks’ 
investors, helping them to better allocate their financial resources and assess the bank’s 
financial position and performance. Instead, the quantitative disclosure index is not 
statistically significant maybe because this type of information is difficult to interpret in 
particular in the banking setting, which is characterized by a large amount of complex 
financial instruments, in particular derivatives that often make any interpretation 
opaque. Consistent with Wagenhofer (2004), a possible explanation is that the effects of 
disclosure depend on three factors: uncertainty, multi-person settings with conflicts of 
interest, and information asymmetry. Information asymmetry led to information opacity 
of annual reports. Financial intermediaries are particularly affected by this issue because 
of managerial opportunism phenomena and excessive cost of disclosure. In other words, 
risk disclosures are difficult to understand because of their incomplete nature and often-
fragmentary presentation. In addition, users have low confidence in the reliability of 
quantitative disclosures because they believe that disclosures have low consistency and 
comparability (CFA, 2016).  
This study provides a threefold contribution. 
Firstly, it adds knowledge to the debate on the relevance of FIRD provided by banks. 
Despite the main literature claims that there are many advantages of a good disclosure 
that results in reduction of the cost of capital, creation of more stability in the whole 
banking industry and consequent reduction of systemic risk and effective tool for 
avoiding banking crises, other Scholar argue that there are some disadvantages related 
to the excessive disclosure due to the complexity of banks’ business because markets 
are unable to incorporate additional information in a beneficial way. Banks often oppose 
to requirements asking for higher disclosures because they determine significant costs. 
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In addition, it is possible that users do not know whether the information is bad news or 
good news, because no further information is usually given. Where given, it is dispersed 
throughout the annual report (Oliveira et al., 2011). Indeed, especially in the case of 
banking institutions, financial risk disclosure information is often provided in 
fragmented way. For example, IFRS 7 requires the presentation of information on 
maximum credit risk exposure, and Basel Pillar 3 requires information on exposure at 
default. Although related, these types of credit risk information are sometimes presented 
hundreds of pages apart, with no cross-referencing between sections. The fragmentary 
presentation of related information makes it difficult for investors to assess their risk 
profile. Overall, the relevance of financial instruments risk disclosure is an important 
tool of helping users to understand the risks associated with on - and off – balance is an 
evident question for the scientific community, indeed the consequences of the lack of 
transparency related to financial instruments, already to their complex nature, are now 
known.  
Secondly, the results are also helpful to practicioners as they suggest that quantitative 
disclosure could be difficult to interpret, so practitioners should made an effort to 
provide more detailed and clear disclosure in order to help users to asses own 
appropriate risk levels. Overall, this study demonstrates that the usefulness (or un-
usefulness) of financial instruments risk disclosure is still an open issue, so it is 
important to provide more evidence to this topic investigating, for example, the 
relevance of the new accounting standard IFRS 9. 
Thirdly, this research is important for policy makers – such as the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) – who have taken significant steps to improve 
market reporting with IFRS 7, however the effects of its application results in a partial 
failure because quantitative information is not relevant for investors. A potential reason 
is that IAS/IFRS are not aligned with the way financial companies manage risk, and that 
they are not bank-oriented standards (Oliveira et al., 2011). The problem is that IFRS 7 
focus only on financial risks, ignoring other kind of risks (such as operational risks) 
faced by banks. This misalignment can culminate in the dispersal of risk reporting 
practices throughout an annual report, rendering them incomparable, and imprecise 
(Woods and Marginson, 2004; Woods et al., 2008). In addition, qualitative and 
quantitative disclosures often are not aligned and this means that qualitative disclosures 
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and management discussion are essential to shedding light on quantitative disclosures 
and overall risk management policy. This problem can be avoided by providing more 
disclosure to complex measurement and management tools of financial risks, often 
poorly aligned with the average investor's financial culture. Moreover, auditors should 
disclose their level of assurance on risk disclosures (CFA, 2016).  
Lastly, it is important to focus on communication and not mere compliance, i.e. 
preparers should adopt a meaningful communication mindset focused on conveying risk 
exposures and risk management policy effectiveness, as well as fostering a dialogue 
with investors (CFA, 2016).  
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